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Since 2000, South Africa has received an influx of Zimbabwean migrants in search of a 
better living. However, due to South Africa’s apartheid inspired immigration laws, many 
of these immigrants are faced with increased difficulty in regularising their stay to realise 
their immigration dream. This thesis examines South Africa’s immigration legislation and 
how it negatively impacts the livelihood regimes of Zimbabwean migrants living in South 
Africa, from a development perspective. Through a critical investigation of South 
Africa’s immigration policy, literature and document analysis, this thesis argues that the 
South African government is reluctant to overhaul its restrictive apartheid inspired 
immigration laws to safeguard its national interests, while covertly concealing its lack of 
capacity and tact to manage the Zimbabwe migrant situation. The study concludes that 
South Africa’s immigration policy is outdated and exclusionary at the core. This has had 
deleterious effects on livelihood regimes of Zimbabwean immigrants as they are unable to 
access critical resources and services such as healthcare, employment, banking and legal 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Introduction 
International migratory movements have been on the rise since the global 
economic crisis of 2007 (Basso, 2015. p. 86). As the deep underlying causes of the global 
crisis continue unresolved, so have the myriad factors forcing people to migrate, 
including wars, diseases, human rights abuse and economic implosion of weak 
economies. While international migration has been increasing, predominantly driven 
along the lines of the South – North nexus, South – South migration also continues to 
swell, with “the world’s 82 million South-South migrants forming about 36% of the total 
stock of migrants” (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2016. p. 
3). Such statistics show that South – South migration is an increasingly significant factor 
in the economic and social development of many developing countries. However, 
restrictive and repressive migration policies, particularly in the receiving countries, have 
situated immigrants in a place where they have inferior legal, financial, economic, social 
and political positions. Subsequently, these policies have contributed to the rise in 
undocumented immigrants, and formation of a precarious, flexible, super exploited pool 
of migrant labour; used by governments and employers to “pull down wages and working 
conditions of the entire labour force” (Basso, 2015. p. 86).  
 This study focuses on the South – South migration problem within the global 
South, particularly Africa, looking at the South Africa-Zimbabwe immigration crisis.  
South Africa has been experiencing an influx of Zimbabwean migrants since 2000. This 
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group of migrants includes documented and undocumented migrants, skilled and 
unskilled persons, formal and informal traders, students, and asylum seekers.  Although 
the exact numbers are unknown, and subject to debate, it is estimated that between 1.5 
million and 2 million Zimbabweans live in South Africa, making up the largest group of 
foreigners in South Africa (Polzer, 2008. p. 6; Landau, 2007; Muzondidya, 2010. p. 38; 
Chiumia, 2013. p. 1; Bolt, 2015. p. 5). Approximately 400 to 700 Zimbabweans are 
estimated to cross the border into South Africa daily; some of whom return to Zimbabwe, 
while others stay (Chiumia, 2013. p. 1). These estimates vary due to several reasons, 
including large numbers of undocumented migrants crossing South Africa’s porous 
borders, and inefficient and unreliable data collection techniques of responsible formal 
authorities such as the South Africa Department of Home Affairs and the Zimbabwe 
Department of Home Affairs. Despite of proper travel documentation, the majority of this 
group of Zimbabweans moves to South Africa as a survival strategy, given the deepening 
social, economic and political challenges facing Zimbabwe, particularly since 2000.  
However, many Zimbabweans who find their way into South Africa, and wish to 
stay and work legally, are finding it increasingly difficult to regularise2 their stay, with or 
without legal travel documentation upon entering South Africa’s borders, hence this 
study. Without proper legal documentation, this group of immigrants is unable to access 
critical resources such as banking, legal representation, proper jobs, and other social 
services like affordable health care and housing. Some Zimbabweans enter South Africa 
without proper documentation because they simply cannot afford the expenses involved, 
                                                      
2 Regularize stay (here and henceforth), refers to acquiring proper legal documentation that allows an 
immigrant to stay or live and work in South Africa legally, such as work permit or permanent residence 
permit or South African passport through citizenship. 
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on the backdrop of major social challenges like hunger and lack of basic needs such as a 
home. For example, due to displacements under the Murambatsvina (government initiated 
operation clean up of 2005), thousands of Zimbabweans were left homeless and resorted 
to moving into South Africa in a desperate need of survival. While the definite figures of 
the numbers undocumented immigrants cannot be ascertained, reliable estimates place the 
number of illegal Zimbabwean immigrants living in South Africa at between 1.5 and 2 
million (Chiumia, 2013. p. 1; Polzer, 2008. p. 6). These are alarming figures, which raises 
concern and an urgent need for investigation, particularly in the interest of development 
for both Zimbabweans and South Africans.   
 As such, this thesis aims to investigate the challenges faced by Zimbabweans who 
move to South Africa in search of a better living, away from the long standing economic, 
social and political complexities engulfing their home country, with no immediate or 
long-term solution in place. One of these main challenges is acquiring legal 
documentation that allows the Zimbabwean immigrants to stay and work in South Africa 
in order to realise their immigration dream. This study questions why it is difficult for 
Zimbabweans living in South Africa (both documented and undocumented) to acquire 
proper documentation that allows them to stay and work in South Africa legally. The 
significance of this study lies in the fact that proper immigration documentation is vital 
for this group of immigrants to make a steady income and build a decent sustainable 
livelihood for themselves and their families back home. The answer lies mainly in 
examining South Africa’s immigration policy. Hence, the objective here is to uncover the 
evolution of South Africa’s immigration policy, highlighting the failure of the South 
African government to overhaul its outdated and restrictive immigration legislation, 
4 
 
which remains rooted in segregationist and apartheid inspired policies and is ineffective 
in addressing South Africa’s contemporary immigration challenges.   
 To meet the objective of this study, the first chapter of this thesis introduces the 
nature of the problem under study and addresses its significance for international 
development studies. Through review of literature, on the main theoretical debates 
surrounding international immigration and its linkages to international development are 
discussed. This helps to understand the underpinnings of South Africa’s immigration 
problems that have been exacerbated by the flooding of Zimbabwean migrants. The 
review of literature also helps to build the argument that answers the research question at 
hand, which asks why it is difficult for willing Zimbabweans living in South Africa (both 
documented and undocumented) to acquire proper documentation that allows them to stay 
and work in South Africa legally. Some of the main theories that shall be discussed 
include the social capital theory, neoclassical economic theory, new economics of labour 
migration theory, world systems theory, and the historical-structuralist theory. Chapter 1 
concludes with the thesis statement and discussion of methodology used in this thesis. 
 Acquiring proper immigration documents that allow one to stay and work in a 
foreign country, such as a work permit, permanent residency or passport through 
citizenship hinges on a variety of factors, but especially the immigration policy. Thus, it 
is important to critically discuss and trace South Africa’s immigration policy from its 
roots, through its reforms, into understanding the present-day immigration legislation and 
its effectiveness or rather lack of. It is considering the above that, Chapter 2 seeks to 
frame the historical background of South Africa’s immigration policy, from its inception 
in 1913, under the Dutch and British colonial control, up to the time of independence in 
1991. The discussion here shows the number of immigration reforms undertaken through 
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the decades, and how the core aspects of that immigration legislation remained 
unchanged and are now outdated, and ineffective in managing contemporary migration 
issues in present day South Africa. 
A more detailed discussion of the root cause of South Africa’s contemporary 
immigration problem with the influx of Zimbabweans is explored in Chapter 3. Chapter 3 
provides a synopsis of the main challenges facing contemporary Zimbabwe, and how it 
has led to millions of Zimbabweans fleeing into South Africa as a survival strategy. This 
chapter clearly outlines problems faced by Zimbabweans as undocumented migrants in 
South Africa, and the livelihood strategies they have adopted to supplement their incomes 
while grappling with constant fear of apprehension by law enforcement agents.  
Chapter 4, addresses how the South African government has responded to its 
immigration challenges. The focus in chapter 4 is directed towards understanding the 
“attempts” at processes of policy reform and many of key pieces of immigration 
legislation are analysed with the intent to examine the actual contents of the legislation. 
As part of the process of creating legislation the Green and White papers (1997-1999) set 
the stage for the South African government’s first attempt at overhauling immigration 
legislation. As such, the contents of the Green and White papers (1997-1999) will be 
analyzed alongside actual immigration legislation, which include the Immigration Act of 
2002, the Immigration Amendment Acts of 2011 and 2014, the Dispensation of 
Zimbabweans Project (DZP) 2010 and the Zimbabwe Special Permit (ZSP) of 2014. This 
chapter 4 is pivotal in addressing the research question of why it is difficult for 
Zimbabweans to acquire the necessary documentation which allows them to work and 
stay in South Africa legally. The chapter also helps to bring to light the proposed changes, 
and allows the identification of problematic positions that may resemble, or point to 
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colonial legislation. Lastly, Chapter 5 provides the conclusion, drawing from the 




Literature shows that migration is a complex phenomenon that requires an 
interdisciplinary approach to understand it, particularly as it relates to development. To 
better understand the ensuing review of literature, it is important to understand the 
definitions of migration and development adopted in this study.  This study defines 
migration as “the temporary or permanent movement of individuals or groups of people 
from one geographic location to another, for various reasons, ranging from better 
employment possibilities to persecution (Hagen-Zanker, 2008. p. 4). Then development is 
here defined as “expansion of people’s freedoms, which consists of the removal of 
various types of “unfreedoms” that leave people with little choice and little opportunity of 
exercising their reasoned agency” (Sen, 1999. p. xii). The objective of this review of 
literature is to discuss the main theoretical underpinnings of migration, showing the 
migration-development linkages that help to explain the Zimbabwe-South Africa 
immigration problem. The main migration theories discussed include the neoclassical 
economic theory, the dual or segmented labour theory, push and pull theory, the new 
economics of migration theory, the world systems theory, the historical structural theory 
and the social capital theory. The findings of this literature review make a significant 
contribution in the long standing migration – development debate, and provide a better 
understanding of the agency of Zimbabwean migrants as they continue to play a central 
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role in the social and economic development of their households, and ultimately that of 
both South Africa and Zimbabwe as a whole. The discussion begins with looking at the 
current migration and development linkages, followed by the theoretical underpinnings.  
Migration and Development 
 
Despite growing research and theorisation of the linkages between migration and 
its impact on development, there have been inconclusive discussions on whether 
migration leads to development (Castles, 2008. p. 10). Discussions on the relationship 
between migration and development highlight both positive and negative impacts of 
migration on both the sending and receiving area. Historically, the various approaches to 
migration and development linkages have informed much debate among lawmakers and 
academics. De Haas (2008) notes that the migration and development intersection debate 
evolved over four distinct phases. The first phase was between the 1950’s and 1960’s, 
which was characterized by “optimism” in the potential developmental impact that 
migration inflows would bring to sending areas (De Haas, 2008, p. 2). De Haas (2008) 
points out theoretical positions that support the notion of positive developmental 
interactions that came with migration. Free population movements in the post-war 
reconstruction period for most European countries saw increased migration from the 
developed countries into more developed economies. Theorists acknowledged the brain 
drain that ensued. However, they argued that the return of migrants with skills, 
knowledge and remittances would power development in the less developed sending 
areas (Hennings, 2008. p. 13). 
The second phase in the evolution of the migration and development debate was 
the period 1970’s and the 1980’s. This phase was dominated by neo-Marxist views, 
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which harboured pessimistic positions about the development-migration nexus. The third 
phase was between 1990 and 2000 and was characterized by changing perception about 
the migration–development relationship. During this third phase, researchers and policy 
makers warmed up to new theoretical views, such as the New Economics of Labour 
Migration theory, replacing the neo-classical theory of migration (De Haas, 2008. p. 2). 
The New Economics of Labour Migration theory questioned over reliance on the 
individual as the sole initiator and decision maker with regards to migration and held the 
notion that the family or the household is central in decision making about migration 
(Castles, 2008). Thus, the New Economics of Labour Migration theory argued that the 
decision to migrate tends to be influenced by the potential economic returns, should a 
family member migrate. It also stresses that the net increase in income for the migrant has 
a direct impact on how much of that income is remitted back to the country of origin for 
family related expenditure. 
However, debate and theorization on migration and development from the 2000s 
onward has become highly optimistic, albeit unresolved. On one hand is a group that 
views migration as “a virtuous cycle of reciprocally positive impacts” in both the sending 
and receiving countries, where the receiving country benefits from human capital needed 
for profitable business and investments, while the sending country benefits from 
remittances sent back home and the return migrants (Hennings, 2008. p. 13). On the other 
hand is a group that views migration as “a vicious cycle of reciprocally negative impacts” 
in both sending and receiving countries (Hagen-Zanker, 2008. p. 4). This group argues 
that migration perpetuates underdevelopment and structural inequalities in the sending 
countries through, for example, brain drain.  
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Brain drain causes further weakening of already weak economies from which 
emigrants are running, forcing the remaining citizens to also migrate outward, as 
conditions continue to deteriorate due to the brain drain. For example, the most educated 
and skilled citizens in the developing or underdeveloped economies are lured out of their 
countries of birth by prospects of higher wages and rewarding careers in developed 
economies, causing further underdevelopment in the areas they are running away from. 
Good examples of this phenomenon are Zimbabwe, South Africa, and India. Zimbabwe 
and India have highly educated and technologically savvy graduates who move out from 
their home countries to either Gulf countries, the United States and or Europe. In post-
Apartheid South Africa, medical professionals have migrated to Australia, New Zealand 
and Canada (Labonte and SAMP, 2006). Such movements leave economies in developing 
countries with a significant skills deficit, which impacts overall economic wellbeing of a 
country, causing further migration of the remaining disadvantaged populations, as is now 
the case with Zimbabwe.  
Arguably, migration can also aid in the transmission of knowledge and ideas that 
can result in positive transformation of cultures, traditions and politics, especially in 
countries that do not have “democratic” governments. Repressive regimes tend to 
monopolize media to their advantage. However, with improved new communication 
technologies (social media) and huge migrant populations in the diaspora, social 
organizing is rapid and can result in governments being forced to address the needs of the 
people. The uprisings in Egypt in 2011 that led to ouster of leaders, Mubarak and Morsi, 
were instigated by a large Egyptian migrant population and nationals organizing together 
through social media platforms. In Zimbabwe, a similar organizing occurred in 2016 with 
citizens, both at home and abroad, using social media to organize against the government.   
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Central to more recent migration-development debates is the issue of remittances. 
Renewed vigor and substantial research supporting positive interactions between 
migration and development point to remittances as a significant source of capital and 
short-term relief for households in times of emergencies. For example, remittances by 
migrants have been significant in helping families during times of natural disasters, like 
the earthquake that hit Haiti in 2010. The World Bank cited an increase in remittance as 
Haitians in the diaspora remitted money to assist their loved ones in the aftermath of the 
devastating earthquake (World Bank, 2010). Clearly, remittances do play a significant 
developmental role in mitigating the impacts of natural disasters. However, research 
remains inconclusive on the far-reaching effects of remittances on overall development of 
sending regions. The issue of remittances is in itself such a contentious issue that it 
requires further discussion and elaboration as provided in the next section.   
Remittances and Development 
 
The World Bank (WB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), and other global 
financial institutions have embraced the idea of the potential of remittances as a 
development tool. Remittances can be monetary, technological, and even 
knowledge/ideas (Faist et al, 2011; Ratha, 2011; Scheja, et al, 2011). Due to the global 
economic restructuring that is in motion, more people from the developing world are 
forced to migrate to seek better opportunities to earn a dignified living. The goal for the 
migrating is to earn, and when this happens, money starts to trickle slowly back to 
developing regions. The amount of remittances keeps growing exponentially. For 
instance, in 1990, the total amount remitted was valued at only US$40 billion, in 2005 it 
had grown to US$167 billion and was up to US$338 billion in 2008 (World Bank, 2009). 
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In 2015-16, the total amount of remittances through official channels is estimated to be 
US$431.6 billion (World Bank, 2016). In contrast, development aid to developing 
countries was US$131 billion, which is almost four times less than the total amount 
remitted by migrants. The question, however, is how does repatriation of the huge sums 
of money translate into real development? To clearly understand the developmental 
impacts that remittances have, there is need to analyze both the micro and macro level at 
which remittances contribute to development.  
In most developing countries, migrants move because of many factors, which 
include lack of employment, lack of health care, famines, wars and political repression. 
The people that migrate vary from individuals to whole families, and they are spurred to 
do so by the need to improve their livelihood situation and that of their extended families. 
As such, when migrants earn money they send it back to their home countries to fund 
education, health insurance, income generating projects and building homes (Ratha et al, 
2011). Due to collapsed social welfare systems in many developing countries, individuals 
are left with no option but to seek ways to sustain themselves and to augment their 
incomes to improve their livelihoods. Interestingly, the collapse of these welfare systems, 
for example in Africa and Latin America, were because of structural adjustment 
programmes (SAP’s) instituted by the World Bank and IMF. 
Remittances can bring about development to countries of origin, and India is a 
notable example of a country that has benefited immensely from remittances. With a 
population of 25 million diasporians, India had a staggering US$55 billion remittance 
windfall in 2011, rising to US$71 billion in 2014 before declining to US$69 billion in 
2015, due to a slowdown in oil prices in the Gulf countries (Rebello, 2016). Meanwhile, 
in the Mexico-United States corridor, Mexico realized remittances of up to US$24 billion 
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in 2014, exceeding revenues attributed to oil (Associate Press, 2016). Zimbabweans in the 
diaspora remitted close to US$1 billion in 2015, which constituted 48% of all foreign 
currency entering the economically troubled country (Mataranyika, 2016). For rapidly 
industrializing countries like India, which is a sending country, migration and the 
resulting remittances led to many developments including increased incomes and poverty 
reduction, improved health and educational outcomes, while promoting productivity and 
access to finance (Scheja et all, 2011). The developmental impact that comes with 
remittances varies, but mostly it has been economically gainful and transformative at the 
micro level, which “individuals and households” fall into. However, these improvements 
in livelihoods come at a cost, especially socially, as it disrupts family cohesion, which 
leads to dysfunctional marriages, and often times children growing up without proper 
guidance of parents and a host of other social ills (Ratha et al, 2011). 
However, not all migrants are highly skilled; some are just high schooled and have 
no specialized training. It is generally accepted that huge influxes of migrants in 
developed economies has an enormous effect on the wage rate (Brettell et all, 2015. p. 
93). For example, in the United States of America, numbers of undocumented Mexican 
immigrants continue to swell and with no legal rights they cannot work in the formal 
sector. The Mexican migrants are relegated to informal job market where they take the 
lowest paying jobs and in the process, keep wages low.  As such, most indigenous people 
of the receiving countries resent migrants on the basis that they are an additional burden 
to the socio-economic system resulting in xenophobic reactions, racism, and 
strengthening of elite social groups that keep to themselves, but exploit desperate 
immigrants for capital gain. According to most economic studies, an increase in cheap 
immigrant labour promotes economic expansion because the more the people, the more 
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the tax paid, and the higher the consumer expenditure, which is a cornerstone of industrial 
capital (Brettell et al 2016. p. 95). 
To harness the economic and social potential of migration, there is need for a 
broader outlook in development planning that allows governments in both receiving and 
sending countries to create policies that complement overall development (Scheja et al, 
2011). The discussion above highlighted many ways that make migration a solid 
development tool, particularly through remittances, which benefit not only the families of 
migrants back home, but the overall economy of the countries of families which receive 
the remittances.  
While remittance benefits have sometimes been equated to the benefits of aid, 
caution must be exercised when dealing with remittances as they cannot replace 
development aid (Scheja et al, 2011). The irony here lies in that there is a wave of 
scholarship that is anti-aid as they believe that aid is a tool that is not meant to solve the 
development problem in the developing world, but is rather a tool used to control 
governments and suppress real economic growth (Moyo, 2010).  
 Economists like Ratha et al (2011) have aggressively tabled their research, which 
shows that if remittance fees are slashed, it will allow migrants to remit more as it 
becomes cheaper to remit. There is evidence that even when experiencing recession, 
migrants keep remitting to their home countries to help keep their families afloat in times 
of severe economic stress (World Bank, 2010).  Global remittance companies have a 
stranglehold on the remittance market, which deprives developing economies close to half 




In addition, remittances seem to tell only part of the story about economic and 
social development. There are other development net gains that are a result of migration. 
these include inward investment, technology transfer, increased trade flows, and 
charitable activities of diaspora communities (Sriskandarajah, 2005). At this juncture, it is 
important to discuss the nature of the relationship between migration and trade linking it 
to the broader development conversation. The point to address is, can migration increase 
trade and propel development in both the sending and receiving areas.   
Impact of Migration on Trade and Development 
 
Immigration can lead to increased trade.  if done systematically, with proper 
selection of immigrants depending on the sending country, the type of commodities, and 
the already existing immigrant population (Genc, 2014) . The huge migrant population in 
the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries can 
help increase merchandise trade. As nicely put by Genc (2014. p. 1), “immigration 
induced population growth increases aggregate demand and output, which in turn 
increases the demand for imports. Exports may increase as well if the presence of 
immigrants in export industries lowers unit production costs or if immigration enhances 
the international competitiveness of the host country more broadly.  The case of South 
Africa shows how increased population influxes into the country has led to high demand 
for consumer goods. At the height of Zimbabwe’s economic turmoil in 2008, 1.5 to 2 
million Zimbabweans crossed into South Africa (Polzer, 2008. p. 8; Crush, 2008). The 
proximity of the Musina Border post plays a crucial role in the movement of goods from 
neighboring South Africa to Zimbabwe. Cross border traders from across Southern Africa 
cross daily to buy goods for resale and the influx of foreign nationals, especially 
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Zimbabweans, has pushed down labour costs for most companies as they exploit the 
surplus labour availability. Between November 2014 and November 2015, Zimbabwe 
imported about USD 2 billion worth of goods from South Africa (Sharara, January 8, 
2016). These figures could be higher, considering that there are some goods that are 
smuggled out of South Africa into Zimbabwe.  
The above discussion provides an example that validates Genc (2014)’s thesis on 
migration and trade. However, it should be noted that Genc (2014) is aware of the 
downside of this position and as such he forwards both the negative and positive with 
regards to the impact of migration on trade. Using results from own research together 
with other data from research done elsewhere, Genc et al (2011) find out that there is a 
causal relationship between international migration and trade. Genc et al (2011. p. 18) 
note that “a 10% increase in the stock of immigrants can boost trade by an estimated 
1.5% on average.” However, the downside is that “results from cross-sectional studies 
need to be interpreted with caution as they may overestimate the impact of immigrants.” 
Studies such as those carried by Genc (2014) evidence strong correlation between 
increased immigration and trade surplus. However, some skeptics believe that although 
these net trade gains may translate to development, they are highly dependent on context. 
The case of Zimbabwe and South Africa has a unique interface that projects a positive 
causal relationship as Zimbabwe has a significantly dysfunctional production economy 
and South Africa has a relatively better production economy. This works well for South 
Africa in that all the human capital coming in from Zimbabwe creates an abundant cheap 
labour pool, which lowers production costs for South African industries while boosting 
net exports and increasing local consumption.  
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The discussion above has helped articulate the migration and development 
linkages, highlighting the historical development of the theorization on this subject. From 
the post-World War reconstruction period to the current period, theorization on migration 
and development has been inconsistent. However, over the past few decades, increases in 
population movements have reignited the migration- development linkage debate and the 
role of remittances has taken centre stage. Creation of rich cultural mosaics, diffusion of 
ideas, brain gain and drain, proliferation of technology are some of the attributes 
discussed that make the migration and development debate relevant at a time when 
population movements are at their highest. As such, the next section in the literature 
review attempts to address the actual population movements, giving vital statistics to 
show the extensive nature of global population movements. Later, I will also address a 
number of theories forwarded by various scholars to establish why people move and 
structural barriers that they encounter in their process of moving. This discussion will 
help contribute to understanding of the Zimbabwe and South Africa migration 
phenomenon, especially how Zimbabweans are moving and the problems they face in 
their quest for a better life in South Africa. 
 
Contemporary Global Migration: Scope and Patterns 
Statistics show that there is an increasing need to understand population 
movements across the globe. The number of international migrants, that is those that were 
born in countries other than where they live, is estimated to be around 244 million, a 42% 
increase from the year 2000 (UN, 2016). The new United Nations dataset on Trends in 
International Migrant Stock: The 2015 Revision, shows that the number of international 
migrants has grown faster than the world’s population. As a result, the share of migrants 
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in the global population reached 3.3% in 2015, up from 2.8% in the year 2000, albeit with 
considerable differences between large regions of the world (UN, 2015). These statistics 
clearly show the growing need to understand population movements. 
The United Nations claims that Africa has the highest number of international 
migrants who originated from another country of the same region (87%), followed by   
Asia (82%), Latin America and the Caribbean (66%) and lastly Europe at 53% (UN, 
2015). This claim is also supported by Ratha et al (2011), who assert that migration in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is predominantly movement within the continent, and “few stocks” 
moving outwards to Europe and the Americas. Statistically, North Africa leads with 90% 
of immigrant movements into France, the Middle East and the Americas (Ratha et al, 
2011). Since the fall of apartheid, approximately 6% of the total African migrant count is 
believed to have moved into South Africa, mostly attracted by the economic viability in 
the Southern African country (Ratha et al, 2011). However, researchers argue the 
possibility of even higher numbers of migration that are not reported. The question is why 
are people moving? Are they moving individually or in chains, and what are the factors 
behind their decision to move? These questions can be addressed through various theories 
that have been posited by various scholars including early theorists like Ernest Ravenstein 
(1885), as will be further discussed in the following section.  
Why do people migrate? 
 
The reasons why people move are as diverse and complex as the migration 
phenomenon itself. As such, there is no one theory that can fully explain why people 
migrate. This section delves into the various contending theories of migration that have 
been forwarded to understand population movements. Each theory is discussed showing 
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how it helps to understand why Zimbabweans are moving to South Africa in floods, and 
what then makes it difficult for them to acquire legal documentation required for them to 
live and work in south Africa legally to earn a steady income for themselves and their 
families back home. 
The limitations to each theory are also discussed, highlighting how other 
competing theories explain the limitation of each preceding theory. For example, Massey 
and Espinosa (1997) argue that most law makers in countries that have robust economies 
tend to adopt policies that draw their positions from neoclassical theories (p. 940). Such 
policies drawn from neoclassical theories tend to focus on deterring undocumented 
migrants by raising costs of migration while lowering the benefits (Massey and Espinosa, 
1997, p. 940).  The goal, as with many such governments, is to craft policies that dissuade 
mass migration to protect their national interest. The United States of America is one 
other example of a government that constantly battles undocumented mass migration 
from Mexico and other countries from across the globe (Massey and Espinosa, 1997). 
However, the limitation in adopting policies based on the neoclassical theories is that 
while the policies may deter undocumented migrants, there is no consideration of the 
possible social development implications, which are then addressed in the social capital 
theories of migration. Understanding these theoretical frameworks from which 
immigration policies are built helps to understand and evaluate the impact of pre-and 
post-Apartheid South African immigration policy initiatives, which were designed to curb 
the mass flow of undocumented Zimbabwean migrants to South Africa. 
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The Push and Pull Theory 
Ravenstein, a geographer, was one of the earliest theorists to seek to understand 
the migration phenomenon. The stage for his work was set in England, where he observed 
various migrants’ movements among the Scots and Irish working men and women drawn 
into an industrializing England (1885), and noted the presence of two forces, which he 
labelled the “push and pull factors” (Castles and Miller, 1998. p. 20). The “Pull” factors 
point to the presence of something of significance that attracts people, especially the 
working migrant, to want to move to get better value for their labour. This could be, for 
example; better wages, less working hours and health care incentives. In contrast, “push” 
factors denote all the undesirables that prompted populations to move away from their 
place of origin. These “push” factors include, for example; inadequate health care 
provision, low wages, high unemployment, and political repression (Castles and Miller, 
1998). 
This positioning by Ravenstein (1885) is logical, but was embryonic in its 
articulation of migration as a contributor to the further industrialization of England. The 
“New World” would bring about new trends in movement and challenge his logic. This 
theory has been criticized for its individualistic and ahistorical nature as it emphasizes the 
individual as the decision maker in migration matters, based on a cost benefit analysis of 
remaining in the area of origin or moving to alternative destinations (Castles and Miller, 
1998). However, the “push and pull” theory is arguably the antecedent of the much more 
recent neoclassical economic equilibrium theory, the new economics of migration theory, 
segmented labour market theory, historical-structural theory, and the world system theory 
(Castles and Miller, 1998. p. 20). While the push and pull theory might explain why 
Zimbabweans leave their home country (push factors) and are attracted to move to South 
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Africa (pull factors), it does not fully address the complex contemporary migration 
problems of South Africa. The theory only focuses on the broad economic cost-benefit 
analysis without taking other social factors into consideration, such as personal 
aspirations, the migrants’ kin, family, friends, and community members in explaining 
why people migrate (De Haas, 2008. p. 11). This social dimension is a critical factor 
when looking at the Zimbabwe and South Africa migration problem because there is a 
long-standing history of migration, which is influenced by social networks. The push and 
pull theory also ignores the structural concerns, which imply unequal access to resources 
like information for individual migrants. Some of these inadequacies are partly addressed 
by the neoclassical economic theory of migration, which is discussed next.  
The Neoclassical Economic Theory 
The neoclassical economic theory has both a “macro” and “micro” dimension, 
which originated because of the inadequacies of the former. Main proponents of this 
neoclassical economic theory are Harris and Todaro (1970). On the one hand, the 
neoclassical “macro” economic theory asserts that the main causes of labour migration 
are wage differentials. In other words, the guaranteed propensity to earn more in the 
developed economies triggers a desire to relocate to such spheres of economic robustness 
(De Haas, 2008. p. 5). The logical reasoning in this theory is that if the wage differentials 
are eliminated, then net labour migration is reduced. Thus, governments have the capacity 
to regulate migration by supporting bi-lateral development strategies that eliminate wage 
differentials (Tomanek, 2011). 
On the other hand, the neoclassical micro economic theory takes a more 
individualistic approach by asserting the rationality of individuals to assess and make 
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decisions, based on the possibility of receiving improved economic gain in their 
destination country (Castles and Miller, 1998; Borjas, 1990). Accordingly, the policies 
that affect expected earnings in sending and receiving countries can influence the size of 
migration flows (Massey, 2005). Through a closer look at the logical composition in the 
theories above, one cannot dismiss these assertions, and that they partially hold true. In 
the case of African migration, in this case between Zimbabwe and South Africa, this 
theory, however, would fall short in explaining a migration terrain that is characterized by 
historically uneven economic growth and other multiple factors that can influence 
decisions to migrate, which are not based on economic gain. The example of South Africa 
highlights the presence of a robust economic engine in the earlier period after 
independence.  
The current political and economic climate in South Africa presents challenges to 
the neoclassical economic theory approach. Due to South Africa’s waning economic 
fortunes, migration into South Africa is no longer about better economic returns, but more 
of a vehicle for survival. For example, migrants are moving away from regions with 
nothing to offer them besides political persecution and famine, to a country that once was 
a destination for gainful migration. This is a phenomenon not explained by the 
neoclassical economic theory of migration. As such, the theory has been criticized for its 
simplistic nature and incapacity to explain actual movements, and or to predict future 
ones (Castles and Miller, 1998. p. 21). Hence, the new economics of migration theory 
was developed in response to the oversights of the neo-classical economic theory, as will 
be further elaborated in the following section.  
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The New Economics of Migration Theory 
The new economics of migration theory was forwarded by Oded Stark and David 
Bloom (1985). The theory asserts that it is not the individuals who count for analysis of 
migration research. Instead, it is the families, households and other culturally defined 
units of production and consumption, which matter (Stark and Bloom, 1985. p. 174). The 
new economics of migration theory rejects the use of wage differentials as the basis of the 
decision to migrate, and that population movement would still occur, even if wage 
differentials were eliminated. As such, there are other non-wage related factors, which 
influence people to move. These could include credit market facilities, insurance, and 
accessible entrepreneurial platforms. So far, it can be argued that although these theories 
above seem deficient in adequately addressing all aspects of migration, there is, however, 
complementarity among them. However, it is evident that labour seems to be a recurrent 
aspect in migration theory, and the desire for people to enhance their economic viability 
remains central in the decision to migrate. This leads to the next theories, known as the 
historical structuralist approach and migration systems theory. 
The Historical-Structuralist Approach and the Migration Systems Theory 
 The historical-structuralist approach is rooted in the center-periphery model of 
development and the Marxist development theory (Castles and Miller, 1998). This 
approach stresses the power dynamics involved in migration, based on the unequal 
distribution of economic and political power in the world economy (Castles and Miller, 
1998). Under this approach, the assertion is that population movements or labour 
movements are controlled by capital; and that exploitation of migrant labour and 
repression of their rights is for the benefit of capital.  
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The historical-structuralist approach’s view on migration and development 
explains the cumulative causation of migration, where valuable human and material 
capital movement from one underdeveloped country to a developed/industrialized country 
(in the case of international migration) or from an underdeveloped region to a more 
developed/industrialized region (in the case of local migration), further undermines 
development in the source/ sending country or region. The argument is that migration 
deprives the sending country of the much-needed human capital increasing dependency 
on the core countries, thus stimulating further outward migration (De Haas, 2010). The 
sending country would have invested in its productive human capital, through for 
example, education and training. However, the already developed industrialized receiving 
countries will continue to benefit from the pool of cheap valuable migrant labour at the 
expense of the brain drain in the sending country, thereby perpetuating 
un/underdevelopment in the already deprived countries (De Haas, 2010). 
The historical structural theory is crucial in this study as it lays the basis for 
understanding South African migrant labour regimes and why they were set up to operate 
in the way they did. The labour recruitment process was cyclical and characterized by 
excessively low wages and hard menial labour. Most of the workers were discarded and 
returned to their countries after their contracts ran out, and  were thus unable to acquire 
legal documentation to stay and work in South Africa legally. Therefore, the historical 
structural theory sheds light on why, in this instance, migrants, especially Zimbabweans, 
continue to encounter barriers when trying to get legal documentation. It also explains the 
continued mass migration of Zimbabweans into South Africa, because the massive brain 
drain is worsening the situation in Zimbabwe, triggering further outward migration. As 
such, the historical structural theory also suggests that the problem of mass exodus of 
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Zimbabweans into South Africa is more of a structural problem that requires a structural 
solution to effectively manage the migration problem from both countries. 
Looking at the case of South Africa, the logic in the historical-structuralist theory 
leads to a significant contribution in understanding the immigration policies that helped 
South African based, European owned transnational companies to exploit foreign migrant 
labour. The discovery of mineral deposits (diamonds and gold) in Kimberly and 
Witwatersrand set the stage for a well-orchestrated labour recruitment drive that was 
cleverly veiled to exploit migrant labour, while not guaranteeing citizenship rights 
(Wilson, 1972; Crush et al, 1991). Although at a significantly reduced degree, this 
recruitment is still in motion today. It has evolved into many new forms that are 
addressed in later chapters of this thesis. Discussion of these new forms of labour 
recruitment will in turn help illuminate the conditions of Zimbabwean migrants and other 
groups in South Africa, and how they continue to be deliberately excluded with regards to 
citizenship rights. 
However, the historical-structuralist approach does not adequately explain the 
complexity of migration. It especially ignores the fact that not all migrants who move are 
coerced by capitalistic elements. Also, it considers group migration and does not account 
for individual decisions that people make when migrating, which is a crucial aspect in the 
nature of migration that is occurring between Zimbabwe and South Africa, where 
migration decisions are also personal and often chain linked. It is against this back drop 
that the migration systems theory was forwarded to explain the interlinkages that date 
back to colonial periods. The relationship between the sending and receiving areas is tied 
to prior contact (Castles and Miller, 1998). An example of this is the relationship that 
Britain has with countries in the Commonwealth. 
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Countries like India, Zimbabwe and South Africa, are former colonies of Britain 
and population movements are heavily influenced by this hegemonic relationship, where 
Britain is the “core” and the former colony is the “periphery,” and where economic 
resources and labour flow from the periphery to the core. As nation states continue to 
interact with each other, migration cannot only be seen to be a predominantly labour 
issue, but that production, distribution and exchange have also shaped the movement of 
population. Looking closely into the theoretical logic in the migration systems theory and 
South Africa’s economic viability, it is evident that South Africa, as the strong industrial 
hub surrounded by failing economies, has adopted a “pseudo-core status,” where it is a 
destination of economic significance to would be migrants. 
The migration systems theory discussed above undoubtedly provides more insight 
into past relationships between countries and how they influence the movement of 
populations. The migration systems theory is arguably closely tied to the network theory 
in that historical past relationships between countries help to forge, for example labour 
treaties that lead to initial movements of migrant labour to the economically viable 
country. The initial migrants over time become conveyors of valuable information about 
migration, which in turn influence other migrants to migrate to the country where 
economic returns are higher. This logic is the basis of the migration network theory, 
attributed to Massey et al (1993). 
Social Capital Theory 
The social capital theory is also known as the network theory. According to Massey 
et al (1993), “the network theory focuses on those interpersonal ties that connect 
migrants, former migrants, and non-migrants in origin and destination areas through ties 
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of kinship, friendship and shared community origin” (p. 448). The network theory posits 
that the lowered cost and risk associated with migration significantly increases the 
propensity to migrate (Massey et al (1993). Also, the availability of information and 
strategic help tends to influence the belief that the rate of economic gain improves upon 
settling in the destination area. Unlike the neoclassical theory which centered on wage 
differential being a critical factor in the decision to migrate, the network theory does not 
have a strong emphasis on this aspect. The network theory holds the view that the size of 
the migration flow does not strongly correlate to wage differentials and employment 
rates, these tend to be offset by lower costs and risk associated with the migration costs 
(Massey et al, 1993. p. 449). 
The network theory provides a profound proposition that explains the Zimbabwe- 
South Africa migration context. The long and well documented history of labour 
migration from Zimbabwe into South Africa is a point of origin in explaining how 
Zimbabwean migrants’ networks evolved. During apartheid, movement into South Africa 
was strictly regulated though many Zimbabweans that went to work in the mines stayed 
and established themselves.  The fall of Apartheid triggered migration into South Africa, 
meaning that those migrants already in South Africa could assist their kin in Zimbabwe to 
come to explore work opportunities. Despite a long-shared history of labour movements 
between Zimbabwe and South Africa, most Zimbabwean migrants especially recent 
migrants have been unable to acquire or renew their legal documentation to allow them to 
work and stay in South Africa. The social network theory to a large extent is the most 
efficacious theoretical approach in explaining the Zimbabwean migrant situation. As 
information permeates about which loopholes to exploit in the migration process, the 
structural barriers or inadequate policy stipulation become apparent because these are the 
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ones that most migrant groups are privy to and avoid them at all costs. The social network 
theory explains how relationships play an import role in the exchange of ideas and 
information about how to migrate without risking their lives like what others 
undocumented migrant end up doing. The downside to this approach is that it does not 
adequately address the individual decisions that are made by would be migrants that have 
no social ties to anyone in South Africa. 
While the above section discussed the main theoretical approaches in migration 
literature, especially the debates surrounding the reasons why people move, it should be 
noted that there is no one main theory. Instead, the theories complement each other. In as 
much as this thesis hinges on economic, and socio-political aspects of migration, there is 
need to focus on the legalities surrounding migration. It can be ascertained from the 
above discussion that the movement of people can, and should be regulated. As such, this 
translates to the position that those migrants moving need to adhere to a system, and that 
system supposedly has to protect their migration experiences without exception. 
However, this is not always the case. As global capital continues to expand and the divide 
between the rich and the poor increases, the movement of migrants will also increase, but 
not their freedom to do so without restriction. This is one of the main reasons that has 
resulted in many different forms of “illegal migration” or undocumented migrant 
movements. 
Considering recent theorization on the importance of migration to development, 
the theories discussed above help shed light on the intricate nature of population 
movements. These theories help to create a better contextual understanding of migration, 
and can help shape policy formulation, resulting in legislation that protects migrants 
while fostering development through migration. Immigration legislation should consider 
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the positive attribute that come with migrants, such as ideas, innovation, cultural richness, 
and remittances, which can have a significant impact on development of both receiving 
and sending countries.  
Permanent and Temporary Migration 
The following discussion on permanent and temporary migration adds to the 
previous discussion on why people migrate and further provides an understanding of the 
migration-development nexus. The discussion here aims to address the nature of mobility 
that most migrants undertake, and to establish the forces that shape their movement to be 
either permanent or temporary. The region under study (Southern Africa) provides a 
suitable model to illustrate how permanent and temporary migration comes to be. The 
socio-economic and political climate in South Africa, before and after the apartheid era, 
presents a marked dichotomy, which will help illustrate how permanent and temporary 
migration regimes are distinct. However, before delving into the discussion, there is a 
need to clearly outline what constitutes temporary and permanent migration, a discussion 
that will be approached from an economic standpoint, highlighting how temporary 
migrants are perceived in the host country.  
The main difference between temporary and permanent migration lies in the time 
the migrant intends to stay.  Simply put, temporary migration refers to a process that 
involves a one-time only temporary stay and the eventual return, which closes the 
migration cycle (EMN, 2011. p. 21). The United Nations defines temporary migration in 
relation to labour migration. It stipulates that labour migrants move for a period of time to 
take up employment and then remit money to their countries of origin (UNESCO, 2017). 
These, however, are not standard definitions, but simply variations of definitions, as the 
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term temporary migration is context dependent. For example, the meaning of temporary 
migration in European contexts may vary from the meaning of temporary migration in the 
African contexts, depending on legislature, which stipulates conditions and time periods 
migrants can stay in a specific country.  
There are various groups of people that constitute temporary migrants. These 
include students, skilled and highly skilled professionals, low skilled workers, family 
members, tourists, refugees, asylum seekers and undocumented migrants. Although 
temporary, these groups of migrants are typically considered economic assets in that they 
help to alleviate shortage of labour in host countries in need of labour. These temporary 
migrants often provide a cheap labour pool from which industries and the local economy 
can benefit and maximize profits through low labour costs (EMN, 2011. p. 11). An 
example was the labour shortage in South Africa after the discovery of gold in the Rand 
and diamonds at Kimberly Mine in the 1890’s. Cheap labour from several Southern 
African countries, notably from Zimbabwe, was employed in these mines and it made 
strategic business sense for the mining corporations and government as it has far less 
reintegration expenditure beside the low labour costs (Bell and Ward, 2000). 
Central to the permanent and temporary migration discourse is the legality aspect 
that determines who is allowed not only to enter, but also to stay in the host country and 
for how long. The world over, stays of migrants in a host country are controlled by 
issuance of visas or permits by the host country. These visas and permits require constant 
renewal, as they are only valid for a specified period, ranging between 1-5 years (De 
Jager and Musuva, 2016). Failure to renew the visa and permit means that the immigrant 
must leave the country, otherwise, he or she will be considered an illegal immigrant, 
subject to deportation or criminal charges. To return to that country, that individual would 
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have to reapply, often from outside that country’s borders, a process that becomes a 
vicious circle for the immigrant until they acquire citizenship, or at least permanent 
residency.  
However, some studies established that constant periodical renewal of visas and 
permits contributes to regimes of illegal migration (EMN, 2011; Standing, 2011). This is 
arguably so because the migration fees that some of these migrant groups pay to acquire 
their documentations are exorbitant and unaffordable to most immigrants. As a way out, 
those who cannot afford the associated fees resort to “overstaying” and work until they 
have enough money to pay for documentation. In some instances, for example, between 
South Africa and Zimbabwe, most migrants from Zimbabwe are so poor that their whole 
migratory process is funded by relatives and sometimes by middle men, with hope to 
repay them once they get to their destination. However, this is what drives them into 
extreme cases of labour exploitation, especially in the fringes of the farming areas of the 
Limpopo Province. Thus, it is logical to conclude that the harder it is for the temporary 
migrants to access legal and affordable support systems to process legitimate 
documentation and immigration status, the easier it is to create illegal migration and 
precarious document regimes of both permanent and temporary migrants.  
Central to this study is the research question why it is so difficult for Zimbabwean 
immigrants to legalize their stay in South Africa, having entered either legally or illegally. 
The history of South Africa suggests that the answer lies in the history of capital 
accumulation and expansion in South Africa led by Cecil Rhodes and the British Crown 
as well as significant Dutch interests in gold and diamond deposits discovered in the Rand 
and Kimberley Mines, respectively. In addition, apartheid policies were crafted to create 
distinct socio-economic pseudo caste-type communities, where some other racial groups 
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had more citizenship rights than others. This subject is succinctly addressed in chapter 3 
of this research study. 
Moving on to permanent migration, this entails movement that is long term, where 
the migrants leave their countries of origin to settle permanently in another. This type of 
movement is the most controlled population movement and involves comprehensively 
satisfying the host country that one is suitable to participate productively in that country 
over the long term. It is a complement to temporary migration in that before you can 
migrate permanently, you would have, often, firstly held temporary status that allows you 
to gain knowledge and skills to become productive at the acceptable and satisfactory 
standard of the host country. A close look at movements of populations shows that these 
stages happen in two dimensions, namely time and space (as it relates to the 
administrative boundaries crossed by the moving population) (Posel and Casale, 2003). 
Permanent migration tends to be consistent through-out the year or over long periods, 
whereas temporary migration tends to be seasonal or having marked highs and lows over 
time (Posel and Casale, 2003). The phenomenon that characterizes the situation that exists 
in South Africa, especially with Zimbabweans, clearly shows that migrant influxes have 
peak times and vice-versa. This is attributed to the political and economic instability of 
Zimbabwe, which is characterized by flight from political violence and high 
unemployment rates, especially during election season. 
Permanent migration into highly developed economies is highly regulated and 
strategic, for the interest of the host country. In the United States, Canada and New 
Zealand, for example permanent migration has “numerical limits or quotas” that are 
rigidly set as a mechanism to control the number of migrants that get permanent status 
(OECD, 2006). According to the OECD (2006), statistics on work-related permanent 
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residency permits granted in 2003 (2002 for the United States), “77% went in the United 
States to persons already present in the country, 33% in Australia, over 55% in New 
Zealand but less than 2% in Canada” (OECD, 2006). These figures clearly show the high 
level of control involved in this type of migration. It is thus no surprise that issues 
surrounding migration and citizenship dominate major electoral platforms in the 
developed countries, and that in most cases, immigration policy issues can help determine 
who governs, based on who implements sound policies on immigration. 
Compared to the developed world, availability of such statistics in the developing 
world, particularly Africa, remains a huge conundrum. South Africa is no exception. It is 
estimated that South Africa has a migrant population between 1, 5-2 million, most which 
are undocumented (Chiumia and Van Vyk, 2014). Statistics South Africa (STATSSA, 
2011) for instance, reports that only 10 000 permanent residence permit were issued 
between 2011- 2013. This reported figure is too low for a three-year period, posing 
serious questions about the collection of statistics and their reporting. Also, a close look at 
the statistics for temporary resident’s permits for the same period shows that about 100 
000 temporary residence permit (TRP) were issued, with the largest chunk allocated to 
Zimbabweans (STATSSA, 2011). This is questionable, due the fact that it is estimated 
that between, 1.5 – 2 million Zimbabweans are living in South Africa. If that many 
Zimbabweans are in South Africa and only 100 000 permits were issued, then this points 
to a large undocumented population. Explaining the slow or rather deliberate non-





This thesis argues that South Africa’s immigration policy framework is shaped by 
outdated and non-evolving segregationist and apartheid inspired positions, which remain 
discriminatory at the core. South Africa’s current immigration dispensation is designed to 
deter certain migrants from the legal path of immigration, channeling them into 
precarious temporary migrants. As segregation of migrants is also based on the country of 
origin, in the selection of who enters the country or not, Zimbabweans are especially a 
group of interest, as they constitute the majority of immigrants entering and living in 
South Africa. Without proper immigration documentation, many Zimbabweans are forced 
to provide cheap labour and are unable to access critical services such as healthcare, 
banking and legal protection.  
Failure to access these critical services has direct negative implications on these 
immigrants’ livelihoods. For example, without formal employment, they are unable to 
earn a steady income to care for themselves in South Africa and or send remittances to 
their families back home in Zimbabwe. Subsequently, without steady income, they are 
also unable to send their children to school to access better education, food security 
becomes a problem, and access to health also becomes a challenge. Because of these 
livelihood challenges, the capabilities of these immigrants to contribute to their own 
development is significantly diminished. 
Review of literature shows that most governments take a neo-classical economic 
approach when formulating immigration policy. Their main concern in reducing net 
labour migration is based on addressing wage differentials that attract migrant labour. 
This is mostly done through supporting bi-lateral development strategies that eliminate 
wage differentials. However, this is a limited approach to dealing with a migration crisis 
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such as the one South Africa is experiencing from an unprecedented influx of 
Zimbabweans over the past decade.      
Looking at the various theoretical underpinnings on migration, including why 
people migrate, there is a need to understand multiple factors that cause people to 
migrate, including the historical, social, economic and political relationships between the 
countries involved, and their domestic state of affairs. This is what is, for example, 
addressed by the new economics of migration theory, which states that there are other 
non-wage related factors, which influence people to move. These could include credit 
market facilities, insurance, and accessible entrepreneurial platforms. The social capital 
theory or network theory also supports this position in asserting that low cost and low risk 
associated with migration can influence a person to migrate, with hope of a better living 
in the country of destination, where wage differentials and employment rates tend to be 
offset by lower costs and risk associated with the migration costs. In addition, the long-
standing migration history of Zimbabweans into South Africa provides a deep seated 
social migration network that is proving difficult for South Africa to manage.  
Further, South Africa has adopted a “quiet diplomacy” policy with regards to the 
role it plays in influencing change in Zimbabwe’s current socio-economic and political 
predicament. As such, South Africa has been dealing with symptoms of a problem, rather 
than helping to address the actual problems in Zimbabwe, which could ultimately reduce 
the mass exodus of Zimbabweans, in this case, into South Africa. This position is 
supported by the historical structural approach of migration, which illuminates the 
cumulative causation of migration, based on the core-periphery model of development. In 
this case South Africa represents the core due to its relatively more industrialized 
economy, which attracts migrants, while Zimbabwe is the less-developed periphery 
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country. The historical structural approach explains how mass migration is perpetuated, 
resulting in the continued underdevelopment of Zimbabwe through, for example, brain 
drain and loss of human capital, which in turn continuously benefits South Africa. This 
may also explain why South Africa is reluctant to overhaul its immigration legislation, in 
a way that eases the plight of Zimbabwean migrants in legalizing their stay in South 
Africa, either as students, workers, permanent residents, entrepreneurs or citizens.  
Furthermore, the large pool of cheap migrant labour provided by Zimbabweans, 
especially the undocumented migrants, is of major economic value to South Africa’s 
labour intensive industries. It allows employers to hire and exploit cheap labour (which 
could otherwise not be available among indigenous populations), thereby maximizing 
profits. The dual or segmented labour theory supports this argument. It postulates that 
foreign workers tend to accept less desirable low skill, low wage, and insecure jobs in the 
secondary labour market, which are shunned by indigenous workers. Due to the 
excessively large numbers of Zimbabwean migrant labour, employers offer increasingly 
low wages, which, to an extent, has also attributed to the rise of xenophobic attitudes.   
Clearly, there is no single explanation as to why it is difficult for Zimbabweans to 
legalize their stay in South Africa, but a range of complementary factors explained in the 
various theories provided in the review of the literature. It may also be argued that the 
South African government does not have the capacity and tact to manage the influx of 
Zimbabwean migrants. Nonetheless, policy is central to addressing any immigration 
problems and requires constant revision to deal with the ever changing problems of 
migration. Although South Africa has attempted to make some changes to its immigration 
policy over the years, the main policy position remains discriminatory, outdated, and 




This library based qualitative study draws from both primary and secondary 
sources of data to provide valuable information needed to meet the objective of the study. 
Understanding South Africa’s current immigration problem of the influx of Zimbabwean 
migrants and why it is difficult for this group of migrants to acquire legal migration 
documentation that allows them to stay and work in South Africa legally requires a 
critical analysis of the historical context of the problem, leading to the current status quo. 
As such, the study analyses existing literature and empirical research of various renowned 
scholars on South Africa and Zimbabwe, particularly in the area of immigration and 
policy, from both a historical and contemporary perspective. These sources provided 
valuable data and information such as historical patterns of population movements on 
both South Africa and Zimbabwe, statistics of migrant populations, reasons for migration, 
their activities, livelihood strategies and problems encountered in their country of 
destination, in this case South Africa. Understanding all this information provides an 
informed knowledge base to build on the analysis and understanding of the immigration 
problem at hand.  
 In addition, legislation plays a critical role in determining immigration outcomes. 
Thus, it is important to also trace the trajectory of South Africa’s immigration legislation 
from the time of its inception during the colonial period in 1913, following through its 
various transformations up to 2016, in present day South Africa under a black majority 
government. This was done, in this study, through a policy analysis approach, which 
helped build a concrete understanding of South Africa’s immigration legislation 
trajectory, showing how the policy has remained exclusionary and discriminatory at its 
core, despite some modifications over the years. Tracing this trajectory also helped to 
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illuminate the genesis of South Africa’s current immigration problem. This policy 
analysis involved identification of all major colonial and apartheid legislation, followed 
by an analysis of specific textual information contained in each of the major immigration 
laws since 2013, through to the current immigration policy of 2016. Apart from creating a 
deeper understanding of South Africa’s immigration policy, this analysis also helped to 
question the intent in the formulation of the policy, and to critically examine the far-
reaching impact of these laws. For instance, to fully appreciate how the laws were 
discriminatory, the study singles out all textual evidence that speaks to any form of 
exclusion, by either race, sex, gender or nationality. 
To understand the South Africa-Zimbabwe migration problem, reference is made 
to a number of recognised sources for statistical data, including Statistics South Africa 
(STATSSA) and the Department of Home Affairs (DHA). Independent research institutes 
such as the Southern Africa Migration Project (SAMP) and the African Centre for 
Migration (ACM) at Witwatersrand University also provided statistical data used in this 
study. This statistical data includes, for example, population movements by numbers, that 
is those crossing the South African borders according to their nationality, travel 
documentation used to enter South Africa, percentages of migrant population being 
apprehended or deported, estimates of the numbers of undocumented migrants, 
employment/unemployment rates, literacy rates, income and remittance trends, 
processing times involved in acquiring documentation for those wishing to regularize 
their stay. These statistics are valuable in highlighting the migration patterns showing 
who is moving, immigration system inefficiencies, and how these contribute to pathways 




However, one major challenge was availability and reliability of statistical data. 
There were several data inconsistencies due to the plurality of sources, and below 
standard record keeping capacities associated with some of the organisations from which 
the data was obtained. To alleviate this problem, there was a need to verify the same data 
with a number of different sources and to understand how the original data was obtained 
by the source. Also, to address this problem, the study focused on government issued 
reports and those from other reputable research institutions that produced statistical data 
that closely resembled government sources. Also, keeping in mind that the concept of 
migration itself is complex it was also important to undertake an in-depth analysis of the 
available data to ascertain its validity and reliability. For example, due to differences in 
definitions and measurement methods, migration data provided by a sending country may 
be different from the data provided by the receiving country. The differences were 
harmonised by considering the methodologies and benchmarks used in ascertaining 























Chapter 2: South Africa’s Immigration Legislation (1913-1991) 
 
South Africa’s Immigration Legislation (1913-1991) 
 
Introduction 
This chapter traces the history of South Africa’s immigration legislation and 
provides an overview of the evolution and transformation of South Africa’s immigration 
laws since the passage of the first South African Immigrants Regulation Act of 1913 up to 
the Aliens Control Act of 1991, the last immigration legislation Act under Apartheid. 
This analysis mainly focuses on major aspects of immigration legislation such as choice 
of immigrants, role of the judicial system and power of the state apparatus; showing how 
this legislation was deeply engraved in the construction of South Africa’s national 
identity and economic structures. The objective is to show the trajectory of South Africa’s 
immigration legislation, highlighting how the legislation remained discriminatory and 
segregationist at the core, despite changes or amendments over years.   
Globally, immigration legislation is used as a tool to determine who is or is not 
allowed entry into a country. It is also used to enforce the terms and conditions that 
migrants adhere to in the given country. Hence, immigration legislation sets the 
requirements and processes involved in naturalization of immigration status for those 
immigrants who wish to stay. For South Africa, these immigration terms and conditions 
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are rooted in a historical period characterized by colonialism and apartheid, a system 
where laws were segregationist and discriminatory, strictly instituted on the grounds of 
gender, national origin, class and, especially, race (Crush, 1998 in Brewer 1999. p. 261). 
The chapter concludes by highlighting notable changes in the immigration legislation 
over the years, showing a pattern where such changes did not address the segregationist 
and discriminatory aspects of the apartheid inspired immigration laws.  
The Immigrants Regulation Act of 1913 
The Immigrants Regulation Act of 1913 was instituted following the formation of 
the Union in 1910 (Peberdy, 1999). At that time, each province had its own immigration 
policy. Hence, the Immigrants Regulation Act of 1913 was created to replace all the 
different provincial immigration policies with one inclusive policy accepted by all 
provinces, the Parliament, and the then British colonial government (Peberdy, 1999). The 
1913 Act had a number of main provisions. First, clause 1 of the Act called for the 
creation of a Department of Immigration (present day department of Home Affairs), 
which showed the high level of importance that it placed on the need to control 
movement of people across the South African borders (Peberdy, 1999).  
The enactment of the first Immigrants Regulation Act of 1913 introduced the first 
Immigration Board in the history of South Africa (Peberdy, 1999).  Members of this 
immigration board were appointed by the Minister to hear appeals of prohibited 
immigrants. These prohibited migrants include a cross-section of the Black, Indian and 
Jewish populations.  However, the amount of power vested in this board was excessive, 
such that the rights of prospective immigrants and prohibited persons were severely 
challenged, setting precedents that exist to this day (Peberdy, 1999). Nonetheless, there 
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was an established process of appeal against prohibition by those immigrants declared 
prohibited by an Immigration Officer, which was also laid out in the 1913 Immigrants 
Regulation Act. A prohibited person wishing to appeal had 3 days to present their written 
appeal and was also expected to present an amount of money to cover “detention 
expenses” and return fare (Peberdy, 1999). The board decision was final, and could not be 
further appealed in the court of law, “except on a point of law” (Peberdy, 1999).  Thus, 
the immigration process was completely beyond the jurisdiction of the judicial system. 
Additionally, it was the immigrant’s full responsibility to prove to the government their 
admissibility and that they were not prohibited immigrants. 
 At the time of the newly formed Union, the first census carried out in 1910 shows 
that the estimated white population was 1.1 million, the Bantu “black” population was 
around 4 million and the Coloureds constituted about 600 000 people (Dale, 1913. p. 13). 
Looking at these numbers, and the racist and segregationist legislation that was used to 
subjugate the populations of those considered undesirables, the obvious intent was to 
keep in check, especially the growth of the Black population, by controlling their 
movement (Peberdy, 1999). The white controlled state was fixated on collecting social 
statistics concerning the black population to track its rate of reproduction. The focus was 
to slow the rate of growth while promoting immigration from Europe to maintain a 
sizeable white population in South Africa. 
   It is imperative to note that this piece of legislation was not only targeted at 
black South Africans, but also others considered undesirables3. The legislation restricted 
inter-provincial movements, which literally prohibited Indian workers from living with 
                                                      
3 Undesirables refer to a cross-section of non-Nordic whites, blacks, Indians, coloureds population 
that made up South Africa. 
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their families. Between (1860- 1911), Indians were brought to South Africa as indentured 
labour to work on Natal’s sugar plantation and were given five year contracts. Upon 
expiration of their contract, the workers had the option to return to their country of origin 
or stay in South Africa as free slaves (Peberdy, 1999). Indians protested against this 1913 
Immigration legislation, led by Mahatma Ghandi, which later led to amendments with 
little significance to accommodate Indians and their families. 
According to the Immigration Act of 1913, blacks were not considered full 
citizens, and were governed by the Act of 1913 that controlled the movement of non- 
South Africans. Technically, blacks were not accorded any rights under this dispensation, 
which made them extremely vulnerable to brutal treatment by law enforcements agents 
and employers. However, the South African government empowered organisations within 
the mining and agricultural sectors to recruit labour from surrounding countries like 
Zimbabwe, Malawi, Lesotho, and Mozambique. These African migrant workers had no 
immigration status accorded to them. They could only work in mines and in the farms. 
When their contracts expired, they were repatriated to their countries of origin and while 
some stayed, they were undocumented migrants. 
There has always been discord about the immigration policy position and bi-
lateral treaties that promoted huge influxes of migrant labour. Mining companies 
evidently operated on a different policy platform, which allowed them to recruit and 
control movement of labour into and out of the Union. As such, the notable ‘us and them’ 
tone in the legislation was largely imprinted into the immigration control apparatus, and it 
kept an all-white nation agenda as an ideal within grasp. This trend is evident in almost 
all the immigration legislation passed after the 1913 Immigration Act. The following 
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discussion further highlights the segregationist and exclusionary nature of immigration 
legislation passed between 1913 and 1991. 
Jewish Immigration and the Immigration Quota Act of 1930 
The immigration of Jews into South Africa was nothing new. Records show a 
steady flow of Jews from 1904 onwards (Peberdy, 1999). After World War 1, South 
Africa was faced with the so called “Jewish immigrant threat.” Jewish migrants from 
Eastern Europe arrived in substantial numbers, which raised alarm within the Department 
of the Interior. The South African government’s main point of argument was that Jewish 
migrants were undesirable and incapable of assimilation (Bradlow, 1978). According to 
some sections within the body politic, Jewish immigrants were considered ‘diseased” and 
would corrupt the white genetic pool (Peberdy, 1999). As such, legislation that prohibited 
the influx of Jewish migrants was passed in 1930, under the Jewish Immigration and the 
Immigration Quota Act of 1930.  
The Jewish Immigration and the Immigration Quota Act of 1930 was a direct  
adoption from that adopted by the United States of America, which limited the number of 
Jewish immigrants into the United States. All the countries of Eastern Europe were 
divided into distinct sections. Jewish immigrants coming from Lithuania, Russia, Latvia, 
Greece, Poland, Palestine fell under those considered ‘undesirable’ (Bradlow, 1978). 
Those from the British Commonwealth, the United States and Western Europe were 
considered ‘desirables.’ The Immigration Quota Act of 1930, under Section (2) 1 of the 
immigration quotas, was to be implemented on a quota basis with each country 
considered undesirable only being allocated 50 migrants (Bradlow, 1978). Also, under 
this quota, the scheduled countries allowed to bring in the so called ‘white immigrants’ 
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were given a quota of 1 000 immigrants per annum (ibid). Bradlow (1978) notes that this 
bill did not directly mention Jews by name as undesirables; rather, it placed restriction on 
specific countries. Hence, the position that the Bill did not discriminate on racial grounds, 
but rather on the grounds of nationality (1978. p. 229). However, for this discussion, it is 
clear to note that the legislation was created with intention to exclude other people based 
on race and country of origin. Traits of this kind are arguably still present in the current 
immigration legislation in South Africa, except that they have morphed into various 
forms of immigration dispensations, which target specific groups of immigrants.  
The Quota system discussed here was implemented by the Department of Home 
Affairs to address economic migrants coming in from Zimbabwe, but without success. It 
was not a successful project because the Department of Home Affairs did not fully 
comprehend the magnitude of the Zimbabwean immigration quandary and their rigidity in 
reforming immigration policy to suit a dynamic youthful democracy with massive 
economic potential. Consequently, the anti-Semitic tone in this 1930 Immigration Quota 
would lead to sharp criticism of the Bill from within sections of South Africa. Unlike in 
contemporary times, the Jewish population had some of representation that allowed those 
in positions of power to discuss the dissatisfaction and resistance towards the Immigration 
Quota Act of 1930, and how it threatened the immigration of those of Jewish origin. In 
contemporary time, for instance, the consultations done for the drafting of the 1999 White 
Paper, were all thrown out at the crucial moment before the Immigration Act of 2001 was 
passed into law. 
To adjudicate immigrant applications under the Immigration Quota Act of 1930, 
an immigration board was set up. This board was made up of Secretary of Labour, 
Chairman of the Board of Trade and Industries, and other high ranking government 
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officials (Peberdy, 1999). The attention given to immigration was elevated because of a 
real threat that the Jewish immigrant posed to the white European utopia, which the white 
nationalist wanted to create in South Africa. It was an ‘Us versus Them’ mentality, which 
similarly pronounced in the current immigration policy, with the only difference being 
that this time is black South Africans directing this positioning to other Africans from the 
rest of the continent. 
The Aliens Act of 1937 
This piece of legislation evidences the chicanery used by some sections of the 
political elite to intentionally dissuade Jewish migrants from migrating to South Africa. 
For this legislation to be passed there was a renewed influx of Germans who identified as 
Jews, which was a cause for concern for most who aligned with the ‘white supremacist 
agenda.’ For instance, an ambassador identified as Eric Louw, in 1935 wrote to all other 
South African emissaries citing an increased keenness by Jewish would be migrants to 
migrate to South Africa (Peberdy, 1999). Louw is cited as inciting other fellow emissaries 
to discourage immigration of Jewish Germans to the extent of overcharging immigration 
application fees, charging £250 where there would normally be a charge of £100 
(Peberdy, 1999. p. 164). This type of disingenuity and total disregard for the rule of law is 
not unique to this historical period. In contemporary South Africa, Acts such as these 
have become rampant, and the core of the immigration system has been corrupted by 
those seeking to gain from immigrants in vulnerable positions.  
At the core of this Act, was the desire to bar German Jewish immigration, and, to 
a large extent, the Aliens Act achieved this. A look at the numbers of Jewish arrivals in 
1936 shows that an estimated 2,500 Jewish immigrants landed on South African shores 
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(Peberdy, 1999. p. 169). However, just a few years later, in 1938, those numbers had 
declined to 438 and 236 respectively (Peberdy, 1999. p. 169). The Aliens Act of 1930 
was heavily influenced by ‘eugenics,’ a scientific doctrine that swept across Europe and 
North America in the 1920s. Originally the ideas surrounding racial eugenics were 
forwarded by theorists like Madison Grant (1916). Grant (1916) believed in the 
superiority of the white race and was convinced there was scientific evidence to back up 
his positions. He believed the so-called Nordic white races to have been the pioneers of 
human development and argued for the separation of other races, as they were weak, 
diseased and inept in advancing the human project (Grant, 1916. p. 46). The ideas of 
individuals like Grant (1916) played an infusive role in getting the South African white 
political elite to envision an “all-white state”. A substantive number of individuals in 
political office clearly believed in the science of eugenics as the cornerstone to building a 
nation state dominated by whites Peberdy (1999).  
This discussion is not merely centered on the composition of the legislation and 
the segregationist racial policies that characterized the Aliens Act of 1937 and other 
immigration bills. Rather, it is also about comprehending the processes and environment 
in which the legislation was passed, and the specific implications the legislation would 
have on the South African society and those aspiring to acquire membership into the 
‘White South Africa’ project. The far-reaching effects of these policies are still being felt 
to this day, under black majority rule in South Africa. The point is, despite independence 
from white minority rule, and the change of government, which came with a new 
constitution, there are sections or remnants of the old South Africa that still exist and 
latently shape legislation, especially from an immigration perspective.  
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The Aliens Act of 1937 became the cornerstone of all immigration legislation 
until 1991. Under this 1937 Act, immigrants were selected by a board appointed by the 
Governor General (Peberdy, 1999; Bradlow, 1978). The immigrants had to be 
assimilable, and if offered a temporary permit, the immigrant who overstayed the duration 
of their permit would end up being ejected from the Republic (ibid). The terminology 
used in this Act speaks volumes. To refer to other racial groups as Aliens points to the 
deep-seated racialized psyche of the individuals advocating for this policy. It should be 
noted that nowhere in the immigration legislation does it mention Africans as immigrants. 
During this period, Africans were considered labour migrants to be discarded once the 
employer has no further use for them. 
The Rise of Afrikaner Nationalism during the Apartheid Period 
After the passing of the Aliens Act of 1937, there were no major immigration 
legislation overhauls, except amendments that were instituted by rival political parties in 
the form of the United Party and the National Party after 1940. The National Party 
leadership believed that the United Party, during their tenure, had amended immigration 
legislation in a skewed fashion to increase immigration of English speaking whites for 
electoral purposes. The constant political jockeying that characterized the late 1940’s 
points to contested ideological positions on what constituted a ‘white South Africa.’ 
Peberdy argues that the ‘Afrikaner Nationalist party’ recalibrated the immigration agenda 
by dismantling of sections of the legislation that promoted British immigration to South 
Africa (1999). Upon seizing political power in 1948, the National party saw the need for 
increased white immigration to offset the balance with a growing urban black population. 
Amendments to the immigration laws targeted creation of a new Afrikaner State and 
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changes saw the reinstating of the disbanded Ministry of the Interior and the appointment 
of Afrikaner leadership in most government institutions (ibid).  
Despite all these changes in immigration policies, the need for cheap labour in the 
mines was real and persistent. To fulfill this need, labour was to be first recruited in South 
Africa. If not enough, it had to be brought from elsewhere in the region. The National 
Party was largely faced with the reality of a growing black population and rising political 
organizing. Keeping in mind that the policy on Black migration was governed by the 
Immigration Act of 1913, which considered blacks non-citizens and undesirable. 
However, because of the need for black labour in the mining and agricultural industries 
the ‘two gates’ policy was instituted.  
The “two gates” policy was essentially a segregationist system where whites of 
European origin had legitimate access to immigration into South Africa (Seidman, 1999, 
p. 422). The ‘back door’ policy focused on the oscillatory recruitment of cheap African 
migrant labour from neighbouring Zimbabwe, Malawi, Mozambique and Botswana 
(Seidman, 1999. p. 422). The creation of this labour system would give birth to some of 
the immigration policy confusion to bedevil South Africa in the post-Apartheid era. Plural 
legislative frameworks governed migration differently for whites and blacks.  Cheap 
migrant labour regulation was strictly enforced with pass-laws that kept black migrant 
populations within their designated stations of employments. However, no matter how 
long black migrant mine workers worked, they were never illegible for permanent 




The Alien Act of 1991 
The Immigration laws that guide South Africa’s positions on immigration are 
deeply rooted in Apartheid. As discussed in the earlier section of this chapter, the 
Immigration Act in South Africa was first passed in 1913 by the first Union government 
of South Africa (Perbedy, 2009). This immigration Act of 1913 was exclusionary and 
only meant to recognize other whites as immigrants (Peberdy, 2009. p. 68). Despite being 
heavily aligned to benefit whites, it had provisions that allowed black African labour to 
be allowed to filter through to work in the mines and in agriculture. The 1913 Act was 
only amended in 1972 to deter Jewish immigrants from entering South Africa.  This Act 
worked in conjunction with the 1937 Aliens Act. These two bodies of legislation would 
control immigration into South Africa until the Alien Act of 1991 (Perbedy, 2009, Crush 
and Dodson, 2007) 
Fearing an influx of Africans from other parts of the continent, with the advent of 
majority rule,  the De Clerk government overhauled the Immigration legislation and 
instituted the Aliens Act of 1991 to further protect their borders. The 1991 Aliens Act was 
referred to as the “dying act of apartheid,” because it was the last piece of legislation 
authored under a racist South African government (Perbedy, 2009; Wa Kabwe-Segatti 
2006; Crush and Dodson, 2007. p. 436). The 1991 Aliens Act was to become the 
blueprint to guide South Africa’s immigration post 1994. It would remain intact until 
2002, and be effectively amended in 2005 (Crush and Dodson, 2007. p. 436).  
The Alien Act of 1991 is problematic. The ensuing discussion makes direct 
reference to the actual clauses in the Bill to understand its contents, while illuminating 
contested areas. First, the Aliens Act of 1991, Section 39 addresses the most controversial 
aspects of the bill, which addresses prohibited persons. According to Section 39 (2) a) a 
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prohibited person is “any person who is likely to become a public charge by reason of 
infirmity of mind or body, or because he is not in possession of sufficient means to 
support himself and his dependent’s that he brings or has brought with him into the 
Republic” (Aliens Act of 1991. p. 17). A close look at the definition evidences the desire 
by the South Africa government to bar entry to people that did not have sufficient 
financial resources to support their sojourn. This could be, arguably, because the 
government does not want to be held liable financially for the upkeep of such ‘prohibited 
individuals’ as it would add unnecessary pressure on the welfare system.  
In the Alien Act of 1937, one of the clauses that was used to discriminate against 
whites of Eastern European origin was a requirement to have enough funds to support 
their settlement in South Africa (Peberdy, 1999). The link here is the discrimination on 
the grounds of financial viability. Discrimination of this kind is unconstitutional under 
South African law, and counterproductive to the reconstruction of the South African 
national identity as constitutional democracy. Section 39 (e) categorizes prohibited person 
as: 
 a) “mentally ill person, or any person who is deaf and dumb, deaf and blind, or dumb 
and blind, or is otherwise physically afflicted, unless in such case the person concerned 
or the person accompanying him or another person gives security, to the satisfaction of 
the Minister, for his permanent support in the Republic or for his removal there from 
when required by the Minister”.(f) “any person who is afflicted with any such contagious, 
communicable or other disease, or who is a carrier of such a virus, as may be 
prescribed” (Aliens Act, 1991).  
 
As a human rights issue, the above definitions are not only abhorrent, but a 
violation on the personhood of those to which it refers.  Neither is this the first time that 
reference to diseased and undesirable persons has been used in a piece of legislation. In 
the earlier discussion on the concept of racial ‘eugenics,’ the term diseased featured in the 
description of an inferior species of eastern European white Jewish race. These Jewish 
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migrants were unwelcome to the Republic of South Africa as they were liable to 
contaminate the ‘white master race’ (Peberdy, 1999). If a prohibited individual was found 
in the Republic of South Africa, they were faced with arrest and deportation. Notably, the 
Aliens Act of 1991 gave sweeping powers to the Minister of immigration and 
immigration officials. The Minister had the power to issue a warrant of arrest and 
deportation order. This clause armed the various law enforcement agents with power to 
stop anyone who they ‘suspected’ to be an illegal alien and demand documentation on 
site. Failure to produce the required documents meant detention pending deportation. 
 Although many amendments were made to the Aliens Act of 1991, there is strong 
evidence of unconstitutional apprehension and detention of migrants. The South African 
Police Services has been accused of being complicit in gross human rights violations by 
using excessive force and detaining migrants under inhumane conditions (Human Rights 
Watch, 2007). For instance, Human Rights Watch notes that undocumented migrants are 
targeted and identified in a variety of ways that include language capabilities, dressing, 
and physical attributes (1998). Chapter 2, Section 12 of the Bill of Constitutional Rights 
of 1996 clearly states that, the “freedom and security of the person” secures the right to 
“not be deprived of freedom arbitrarily or without just cause,” to “not to be detained 
without trial,” to “not be treated or punished in a cruel, inhumane, or degrading way,” 
and to be "free from violence from both public and private sources.” (South Africa, 
1996). Clearly, despite some changes over the years, the Aliens Act of 1991 remained 
discriminatory and segregationist at its core. 
In conclusion, this chapter highlighted the origins of discriminatory and 
segregationist immigration legislation in South Africa, which targeted all non-Nordic 
white races.  The trajectory of South Africa’s immigration laws, discussed from 1913 up 
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to 1991, shows a continuous and deliberate effort to deter out non-white races from the 
country. This was achieved by instituting restrictive immigration legislation over the 
years, with total disregard of the cosmopolitan nature of their country. For instance, the 
deliberate exclusion of whites of Jewish origin, Indians, and the non-recognition of black 
Africans as immigrants, as shown under the various Acts discussed, highlights the 
discrimination and segregation contained in the immigration law, which has remnants still 
visible in present day South African immigration legislation. The question is why, despite 
this clear discrimination, black Africans, and in particular Zimbabweans as they are the 
subject of study, continue to flock to a country with such segregationist immigration 
laws? The answer lies in understanding Zimbabwe’s current socio-economic and political 
climate, and the various push factors that are forcing Zimbabweans to migrate to nearby 
South Africa in floods, with or without proper documentation.  
Theoretical foundations discussed in chapter one helped identify push factors as 
the reasons why people migrate, while the discussion on South Africa’s immigration 
legislation trajectory in Chapter 2 helped us get a deeper understanding of the historical 
background of South Africa’s immigration laws. The following discussion in Chapter 3 
will show and explain why Zimbabweans are migrating to South Africa in masses, 
particularly since 2000. The issues discussed will provide an understanding of the root 
causes of the Zimbabwe - South Africa immigration crisis, and help identify possible 
effective ways to manage the problem.  
                                                Chapter 3: Contemporary Zimbabwe: A Synopsis of an Economy in Crisis 
and the Mass Exodus into South Africa 
 
Contemporary Zimbabwe: A Synopsis of an Economy 
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in Crisis and the Mass Exodus into South Africa 
Introduction 
This chapter examines current complexities of Zimbabwe’s multi-dimensional 
national crisis and how those problems have pushed people to look for alternative means 
of survival through migration into neighbouring South Africa. The chapter especially 
focuses on macro-economic policies instituted to try to solve deeply embedded national 
problems, such as remnants of the failed Structural Adjustment Programs of the 1990s 
and unequal land ownership inherited at independence in 1980, which was skewed in 
favour of the former white colonialists at the expense of the indigenous Zimbabweans. 
The goal is to understand the crisis in governance and social problems like citizenry 
unrest, collapsing infrastructure and other numerous factors that crippled Zimbabwe, 
thereby placing into context the mass exodus of Zimbabweans into South Africa. This is 
important because understanding these issues helped to get to the root problem of the 
Zimbabwe-South Africa migration crisis to find effective ways and approaches to manage 
the actual problem, and not just the symptoms. 
Lack of strong, relevant and enforceable national policies, worsened by 
maladministration of the already existing policies can largely be attributed for most of 
Zimbabwe’s national crisis today. Faced with constant domestic and international 
pressure and worsened unexpected fast paced turn of events on the social, political and 
economic front, the Zimbabwean government has constantly resorted to creating a 
cocktail of reactionary policies to try and mend an economy in freefall. Not surprisingly, 
the result was a deepening national crisis and an economy in freefall, forcing millions of 
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Zimbabweans to flee the country, escaping to mostly neighbouring South Africa en-
masse, both legally and illegally. 
The recent wave of migration into South Africa is one of Zimbabwe’s four notable 
waves of mass migration whose roots can be traced back to the time of independence in 
1980. The first immigration wave was triggered by the liberation war victory of the black 
majority, led by Robert Mugabe of the ZANU-PF party, against the white government led 
by Ian Douglas Smith. As a result, the defeated former white colonialists left Zimbabwe 
in large numbers to settle in South Africa. The second notable wave of mass migration 
was between 1983 and 1987. This is when the Ndebele people fled into South Africa in 
search of refuge against large-scale massacres orchestrated by the ruling government 
under ZANU-PF, during the Gukurahundi4.  The third wave of migration is noted 
between 2000 and 2008, involving the mass exodus of economic and political refugees at 
the height of economic and political turmoil in post-independent Zimbabwe. The fourth, 
and most recent (2013 onward) mass migration was in response to an economic and 
political crisis under the multicurrency economic dispensation led by the US dollar as the 
main currency (De Jager and Musuva, 2016. p. 15). These distinct phases of post 
independent Zimbabwe came with several challenges that forced millions of 
Zimbabweans to flee to South Africa in search of a better living. 
 In response, South Africa instituted a number of immigration policies to try and 
curb the influx of immigrants from Zimbabwe and other African countries. Some of these 
policy reactions are concurrently decrypted in this chapter, from the 1990s to date, 
                                                      
4 Gukurahundi was a period (between 1983-1987) of large scale massacres of the Ndebele people led by the 
Zanu-P.F government under R.G Mugabe, who unleashed a North Korean trained military unit known as 
the 5th Brigade to reign terror and silence dissent from the Ndebele people. 3, 750 to 30, 000 deaths were 
recorded during this period (Hill, 2005. p. 77). 
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looking at their “supposed” evolution and suitability in dealing with the mass migration 
problems. Focus is placed on analysis of South Africa’s immigration policy instruments, 
such as the Aliens Control Act of 1991, the Draft Green and White policy papers between 
1992 and 2000, the Immigration Act of 2002 and  the Amendment Acts of 2011 and 
2014. Focusing on these policy instruments will help illuminate the defective immigration 
policy prescription of racist Apartheid. Additionally, the chapter discusses the ability of 
the ruling government under the African National Congress (ANC), to address South 
Africa’s immigration policy inadequacies, or rather out-datedness. This discussion will 
ultimately help in analysing South Africa’s current immigration policy and other efforts 
made to address the Zimbabwe situation. These included, two emergency dispensations, 
the Dispensation of Zimbabwean Project (DZP) of 2010 and the Zimbabwe Special 
Dispensation Permit (DSP) of 2014, which were created to deal with the influx of 
Zimbabwean immigrants. 
Recent studies indicate that the number of Zimbabweans flowing into South 
Africa has doubled since the electoral victory of ZANU-PF in the 2013 presidential 
elections (De Jager and Musuva, 2016. p. 15).  It is estimated that an average of 700 
undocumented Zimbabweans are making their way into South Africa daily, in addition to 
the 3 to 4 million Zimbabweans who left Zimbabwe in the last decade (Sisulu, Moyo and 
Tshuma, 2007. p. 553). Cleary, this is indicative of a problem within Zimbabwe’s 
borders, which is causing citizens to leave the country in unprecedented numbers. 
Ironically, not long ago Zimbabwe used to be considered an economic powerhouse with 
the second most viable economy after South Africa in the period just before and soon 
after independence in the early 1980s. Today, Zimbabwe ranks one of the lowest on the 
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Southern African development index. The distinct superiority of the South African 
economy has no doubt been a huge pull factor for Zimbabweans. 
To better understand the Zimbabwe-South Africa migration nexus, it is equally 
important to take a close look at the nature of the population movements, including both 
legal and illegal migration currents that swept through South Africa especially from the 
year 2000 onwards. The desperation for alternative “decent” forms of livelihoods created 
impulsive and unplanned migrant courses. These movements are characterized by lack of 
education on immigration processes and lack of financial resources to file for the 
necessary legal immigration documentation. All this alludes to be a highly prevalent form 
of precarity amongst most Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa. This precariousness is 
further exacerbated by a hostile immigration policy and a political and public discourse 
that denigrates the rights of immigrants. 
Zimbabwe’s Economic Decline 
Zimbabwe’s economic and political problems are a result of a myriad of factors, 
ranging from poor monetary policies, to fiscal indiscipline, cronyism and constant 
political jockeying by political figureheads. The subject of Zimbabwe’s economic decline 
has been widely documented. As such, focus will centre on poor macroeconomic policy, 
land-reform, and a political climate characterized by decaying rule of law, intimidation, 
and violence against anyone in opposition with the ruling Zimbabwe African National 
Union Patriotic Front (ZANU PF). As such, it is plausible to conclude that the problem in 
Zimbabwe is political as much as it is economic. 
 Since adoption of the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP’s) between 1991 
and 1995, Zimbabwe’s economy has been in perpetual free fall. Despite several efforts by 
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the Zimbabwean government to rescue the situation through instituting a number of 
economic development strategies, the results have been dismal. This study, however, 
focuses on the period between 1997 and 2011 because it is a critical period that helps to 
appreciate the depth of problems facing Zimbabwe and why Zimbabwean masses are in 
exodus to South Africa in hope of better opportunities. This period also exposes the 
failures of the Zimbabwean government, with regard to implementation of sound 
economic reforms that positively transform the lives and livelihoods of its citizens. 
 The period 1997-2011 is also the most controversial period in Zimbabwe’s 
history as it was characterized by massive political upheavals and, catastrophic levels of 
inflation and unemployment unprecedented in the history of independent Zimbabwe. To 
try to deal with the situation, among a number of other strategies, the Zimbabwean 
government developed a cocktail of economic strategies. Focus of this discussion will be 
on only two strategies: The Zimbabwe Programme for Economic and Social 
Transformation (ZIMPREST) (1996-2000), and the National Economic Development 
Priority Programme (NEDPP) (2006). Failure of these programs to achieve the needed 
change showed that they were simply ineffective reactionary projects created to try and 
“jumpstart” a decaying economy. The year 1996 marked a huge shift in Zimbabwe’s 
economic and political landscape. Visible signs of economic stress and growing dissent 
among citizens over the state of affairs began to surface, resulting in the creation of 
ZIMPREST. 
ZIMPREST was created as a macroeconomic policy response meant to play a 
reconstructive role. It was a development strategy that was initially supposed to be 
launched in January, 1997, but due to numerous factors, which included food price hikes, 
industrial stagnation and advice against its implementation from the International 
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Monetary Fund (IMF), it was later launched in February, 1998 (Logan and Tevera, 2001). 
It was launched as a successor to the failed Economic Structural Adjustment Programmes 
(ESAP), which were officially disbanded in 1996. The mandate of ZIMPREST was that 
of consolidating or rather realigning the economic machinery, which had been 
destabilized by the implementation of the neoliberal informed SAP’s. According to the 
African Development Bank (1999. p. 13),“the major themes of ZIMPREST were, urgent 
restoration of macroeconomic stability (low inflation and interest rates, stable exchange 
rate); facilitating the public and private savings and investment needed to attain growth; 
pursuing economic empowerment and poverty alleviation by generating the opportunities 
for employment and encouraging entrepreneurial initiative; investing in human resources 
development; and providing a safety net for the disadvantaged.” 
ZIMPREST commenced with an overall GDP growth of around 7 %. It targeted 
budget-deficit cuts to 6.5 % of GDP by 2001, inflation reduced to 5 per cent by the end of 
2000, and the creation of 42,000 jobs in the next three years (Kanyenze et al, 2011. p. 40). 
During the 1996-2000 period, the average annual GDP growth rate was 2, 41% (Ruwo, 
2014). This was a considerable decline from the projected 6.5%, which was anticipated. 
Impressive but unrealistic targets were set, but the reality with ZIMPREST was that it 
was guaranteed to fail from the onset. In 1997, it became visibly clear that Zimbabwe’s 
economic decline was in effect. The Stock Market crash on November 14, 1997 was a 
huge blow to ZIMPREST as an economic recovery blueprint (Munangagwa, 2009). As a 
result of the economic turmoil, civil strife sprouted and became pervasive in most urban 
and rural centres with record numbers of strikes (232) being recorded as the people were 




To create even more uncertainty, the war veterans, in protest, staged demonstrations 
demanding reinstatement of their benefits to levels prior to the liberalization and 
downsizing brought about because of ESAP. The war veterans proved a powerful bunch 
that had the political clout that forced the government into making another economically 
inept decision. In December 1998, the Zimbabwean government agreed to award each 
registered war veteran ZW $50 000 and a monthly equivalent of 2000 USD (Kanyenze et 
al, 2011). The government had no money for such a capital-intensive project. As such, 
this was a purely political and economically unsound decision, which proved costly. 
Around that same period, war broke out in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) 
and the Robert Mugabe led government, against advice from the International Financial 
Institutions (IFI), went ahead to commit to a perilous and unwarranted war. This war 
exercise cost Zimbabwe, “3 million US dollars” per single day and the government spent 
an estimated “6 billion Zimbabwe dollars,” which was unbudgeted for, with innocent 
lives were lost for an unjustified cause (Munangagwa, 2009). Meanwhile, these policy 
failures were triggering panic and social unrests among Zimbabweans.  
 In response to the failures of ZIMPREST, the Zimbabwean government sought to 
reengage themselves through implementation of another macroeconomic policy called the 
National Economic Development Priority Programme (NEDPP). This programme was 
launched at the height of a politically tense environment in Zimbabwe. The succession 
battles of who would succeed Robert Mugabe were just gathering traction. Launched in 
2006, its mandate was to cut bureaucratic red tape and accelerate solutions to declining 
economic performance by reducing inflation and raising 2,5 billion (US) dollars for 
recapitalization of the national economy (Matikinye, April 13, 2006). The NEDPP, sold 
as a joint economic revival effort by government and the private sector, was designed to 
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create economic stability within a period of 6 to 9 months (Ndlela, 2004). With inflation 
hovering around 913% and unemployment rising above 85% at the point of launch, 
NEDPP was not only supposed to ease the problem, but to “create something out of 
nothing, which was not only a dream, but also a pure disregard for the wellbeing of the 
Zimbabwean people (Ndlela, 2004).  
Due to the fact that Zimbabwe had defaulted on its loans with the IMF, and the 
subsequent suspension and sanctioning of Zimbabwe, there was not a clear explanation as 
to how the government was to raise money to fund their ambitious project NEDPP. This 
project also had a role to play in re-addressing the displaced market vendors in most 
urban centres, who were forcibly removed from their places of business and homes under 
the“Operation Murambatsvina project.”5 This clean-up operation left hundreds of 
thousands homeless, without adequate sanitation and clean water. This resulted in 
catastrophic humanitarian conditions where people fell ill to preventable water borne 
diseases such as cholera and dysentery due to lack of proper sanitary infrastructure and 
clean water (Ukuthula Trust and Solidarity Peace Trust, 2015). Due to its failures, the 
NEDPP project was abandoned within less than two years of its launch.  
The constant policy changes and failures were a clear indication of a government 
under duress and without a clear sense of direction. One cause of concern was also that 
the government had divided efforts as the ruling party was constantly in a campaigning 
mode, which encouraged politically motivated decisions rather than economically sound 
ones.  As a result, the ruling government was faced with increasing unpopularity and a 
waning support base in the face of strong opposition of the increasingly popular 
                                                      




Movement for Democratic Change (MDC) party. To try and regain popularity, ZANU-PF 
had to come up with other creative strategies, including revisiting the unresolved land 
question of unequal land ownership between the whites and indigenous Zimbabweans, 
resulting in the controversial Fast Track Land Reform Program of 2000.   
 The Fast Track Land Reform Program was controversial in that while it was an 
effort to correct a long standing historical injustice in land ownership between the former 
colonial white settlers and the indigenous Zimbabweans, the manner in which it was done 
led to deep suspicions that it was more a political move by the ruling party to drum up its 
waning support base and silence critics, especially the MDC, who were largely supported 
by the white commercial farmers base. While the main objective of this land reform was 
to correct a historical injustice and to empower indigenous Zimbabweans, it was also 
meant to boost agricultural production and contribute to the overall economic growth of 
the whole country. However, the results were another disaster. As an agro-based 
economy, 60-70% (two- thirds) of the country is employed in the agricultural sector 
(Maiyaki, 2010). Disruption of economic activity in the agricultural sector through the 
land grabs thus obviously created a host of socio-economic and political problems that 
recalibrated life for the majority of Zimbabweans. 
At independence in 1980, about 5, 600 white commercial farmers controlled 
almost 15.5million hectares of Zimbabwe’s prime agricultural land, while about 780, 000 
black Zimbabweans had access to less than 16, 4 million hectares, a position that indeed 
needed to be corrected (Moyo, 2011). Although the majority of the land was now 
transferred to the majority of Zimbabweans, the manner in which the programme was 
implemented, involving inadequate planning, lack of post settlement support, violence, 
and political intimidation resulted in unforeseen problems (Musodza, 2016). Since then, 
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agricultural production has gone down, food insecurity increased, loss of jobs on the 
farms forced former farm workers into the already struggling job market and 
unemployment increased to unprecedented levels, companies are underperforming and 
shutting down and there is increased international isolation. As a result, the crisis in 
Zimbabwe continues to deepen without a clue by the government on how to fix the 
entanglements holding back the country’s development trajectory. With no sign of hope 
and a solid plan in place to correct the crisis, Zimbabweans have been left with no option 
but to flee the country and migrate to other countries, such as South Africa, to find a 
better living. 
The Zimbabwean Exodus into South Africa 
As mentioned earlier, although mass movement of Zimbabweans out of the country 
into South Africa happened in notable waves starting from the early 1980s, the mass 
exodus of 2000 and 2008 can be said to be the biggest wave of migration in the history of 
independent Zimbabwe to this date, although people continue to move albeit in smaller 
numbers. A string of damaging policies to the well-being of Zimbabweans, such as 
political violence leading up to the re-election of President Robert Mugabe in 2009, 
Operation Murambatsvina6 (clean up the slums) of 2005, and the ill planned Fast Tracked 
Land Reform Program of 2000 forced millions of Zimbabweans to migrate to South 
Africa in search of a better living (Sisulu, Moyo and Tshuma, 2007, p. 555). As migration 
continued, so did the brain drain. The majority of people leaving the country were 
                                                      
6 Operation Murambatsvina refers to the “clean-up operation that was carried out by the ZANU Pf led 
government to rid urban high density suburbs of so-called illegal dwellings. 
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qualified professionals as well as skilled and unskilled workers who were obviously much 
needed in the growth and overall development of the nation of Zimbabwe.  
The period 2006-2008 was especially critical as that was the time many highly 
qualified and skilled workers like teachers, doctors, nurses, technicians, accountants, 
lawyers, engineers, skilled farmers and also those with modest high school education left 
the country in a rush. For instance, the Progressive teacher’s Union of Zimbabwe 
estimates that over 26, 000 qualified teachers left the country between 2006 and 2008, 
leaving an obvious dent on the county’s education system among a host of other related 
social and economic problems (De Jager and Musuva, 2015. p. 24). 
 It must be noted that the cross-section of both professional and non-professional 
Zimbabweans experience the migration process differently. For example due to the high 
demand of actuarial scientists, medical doctors in South Africa, these group are recruited 
while in Zimbabwe and their work permits are processed by the South African High 
Commission in Zimbabwe. This makes their migration process fast and allows them to 
settle in South Africa without facing many bureaucratic hurdles.  
In contrast, the proximity of South Africa made it a destination of first choice to 
the majority of Zimbabwean migrants, particularly those who were not well connected 
and well financed to move across the seas too Europe or the Americas.. The Beitbridge 
border post is the busiest point of entry in Southern Africa and the trade gateway to 
Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania and other countries in the region. However, this 
border is not the most secure point of entry as it is riddled with loopholes that can be 
manipulated to allow illegals to enter into South Africa for a fee (Tshivhase, 2015). 
Corruption amongst border enforcement agencies at the South Africa –Zimbabwe border 
post is an old phenomenon that has since become highly systematic and lucrative to the 
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individuals involved. Migrants without proper legal documentation and low skill levels 
resort to clandestinely crossing into South Africa through risky channels operated by 
smugglers. There is more than enough documented evidence citing cases of inhumane 
experiences that desperate men, women and children migrating into South Africa are 
subjected to.  
According to the Human Rights Watch (HRW) some of the most brutal 
circumstances that Zimbabwean migrants face are when jumping the border through 
crossing the crocodile infested Limpopo River and directly through the border post 
dealing with law enforcement agents (2006). Substantiated investigative journalism 
professionals established that the South African police are complicit in the ill-treatment of 
undocumented migrants (HRW, 2006). 
 As an effort to rid South Africa of illegal Zimbabwean immigrants, the South 
African government, through their anti-immigrant policy stance, deported close to 200 
000 Zimbabweans in 2006 (Human Rights Watch, 2008). However, because of the porous 
border, many of these deported individuals illegally found their way back into South 
Africa (Human Rights Watch, 2008). More recently, mid 2015, approximately 5 000 
migrants were crossing into South Africa daily, which translated to almost 40 000 
migrants per week (The Financial Gazette, August 21, 2015). These figures are just 
estimates of those that were using designated points of entry, suggesting an even larger 
number of Zimbabwean migrant populations still trickling into South Africa during this 
period, considering the unaccounted illegal immigrants.  
Considering Zimbabwe’s historical political and economic turmoil leading to the 
current status quo, it is undeniable that Zimbabwe’s economy is comatose and this is 
directly linked and positively correlated to the mass exodus of Zimbabweans into South 
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Africa. The manufacturing industry is not existent anymore, the agro-industry is broken, 
and the dollarized economy is making it difficult for Zimbabweans to afford necessities 
such as health, education, and food against an irregular meagre monthly salary that can 
hardly cater for the family through to the next paycheck. Faced with limited choice, 
migrating to South Africa is the immediate plan in hope for a better living.  
It is one thing to hope for a better living, and it is yet another, to actually experience 
and live the dream of migrating across the border. For most Zimbabweans, this remains 
just but a dream as the following discussion will show. The viability of the decision by 
many Zimbabweans to migrate to South Africa is analysed in the following discussion, 
exploring South Africa’s current state of affairs economically, receptiveness to 
Zimbabwean migrants, and the various livelihood strategies adopted by Zimbabweans to 
stay afloat in an increasingly hostile foreign environment. With a rising unemployment 
rate estimated at 26%, and, among other domestic challenges, increased pressure on local 
resources exerted by the over 2. 5 million Zimbabwean migrants living in South Africa, 
such as housing, health facilities, and the scarce job market, Zimbabweans are faced with 
obvious challenges including legal rights and violent xenophobic reactions from the local 
South African citizenry, particularly in the high density areas and informal market 
environments where they interact and clash with higher populations of disadvantaged 
indigenous South Africans populations. (STATSSA, 2016. p. iv).  
 Although there is much debate among researchers, media reports and government 
statistics on the actual numbers involved in the cross-border traffic between Zimbabwe 
and South Africa, what is at least certain is that the numbers are on the rise. Estimates by 
the official South Africa statistical office show a steady rise of South Africa-Zimbabwe 
cross border traffic from just fewer than 200, 000 in the mid-1980s to over 700, 000 in 
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1995 and over 1.6 million in 2010 (Statistics South Africa, 2010; Crush and Tawodzera, 
2016. p. 4). Although these statistics represent legal document holders crossing the South 
African borders through Zimbabwe, for various trades and reasons, the numbers of the 
undocumented is still to be ascertained, yet they are the very group of people that are 
often desperate and require attention of the governments of both the sending and 
receiving country, in this case Zimbabwe and South Africa respectively. Understanding 
the phenomena of undocumented migrants is paramount to the drafting of domestic and 
international development goals such as food security, housing, employment, service, 
social impacts and international relations between the countries involved.  
          South Africa is 2011 census recorded about 515, 824 black Zimbabweans living in 
South Africa, an increase from an estimated 509, 000 in 2007 (according to various 
projections). More recent figures show that over 1,5 -2 million Zimbabweans are now 
currently living in South Africa and over half of them are undocumented (Chiumia and 
van Vyk, 2014). Normally, immigrants need visas or permits to be allowed into countries 
where they are not citizens. Undocumented migrants are those migrants who do not 
possess the required legal documentation to be in the country as stipulated by the laws of 
that country (International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2015). For this study, 
undocumented migrants refer to asylum seekers, refugees, and illegal immigrants. This 
broad categorization of undocumentedness stems from the fact that the South African 
immigration law treats these groups of people the same due to their lack of citizenship 
rights, which renders them aliens. A big part of understanding the national development 
problems associated with illegal or undocumented immigrants is to first understand their 
livelihoods or survival strategies after migrating, hence, the following discussion. 
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Livelihood Strategies of Immigrant Zimbabweans Living in South Africa 
            Zimbabweans are the largest population of immigrants living in South Africa, 
both documented and undocumented Zimbabwean migrants find it increasingly difficult 
to make a decent living, in South Africa. One of the main causes of such difficulties stems 
from failure to acquire legitimate stay, due to increased difficulty in naturalising their 
stay. South Africa’s restrictive immigration policy, and increased xenophobic attitudes 
from South African locals are but some of the main reasons that make it a tumultuous task 
for Zimbabweans to secure decent livelihoods. To survive, Zimbabwean immigrants have 
had to come up with different, sometimes very creative strategies to eke out a living in a 
seemingly hostile, but promising land. Through practical on the ground studies done by a 
number of other researchers and scholars, as well as personal experiences and first hand 
witness and encounters with family members and friends I lived with in South Africa for 
over 2 consecutive years, it was interesting to note how the majority of illegal 
Zimbabwean migrants living in South eked out a living through a number of tactics 
elaborated below.  
Selling Cheap Labour   
 Despite South Africa’s strong economic and political foundations compared to 
other countries in the region, the country suffers from severe income inequality, poverty, 
unemployment and inadequate job skills among its local labour pool (OECD, 2015). 
Forced out of the already tough job market, undocumented Zimbabwean migrants in 
South Africa quickly opt to sell cheap labour in the country’s various economic sectors, 
particularly in the mining, agriculture and manufacturing industries. In many cases, 
immigrants find employment as petrol attendants, security guards, waiters, janitors, farm 
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labourers, and domestic help for some well to do families (Hungwe, 2013). As domestic 
help, the immigrants often live in with the families who employ them and are paid low 
wages, just to survive and send as much as they can from the little income as remittance 
to care for their families back home.  
Overall, South Africa has a high unemployment rate estimated at 27.1% among 
active job seekers and projected to be much higher among youths, at over 30% 
(STATSSA, 2017, p.9 &11). Although young South African’s are given first preference 
to employment compared to foreigners, many employers, are more ready to hire foreign 
labour because it is cheaper and makes more business sense to them. Employers also 
maximise on the desperation of foreigners, especially undocumented immigrants, by 
offering a job, but at a low wage, something which the local South Africans are not ready 
to accept. As a result, Zimbabweans providing cheap labour end up taking more of the 
jobs that would have otherwise gone to local South Africans. 
  In addition to being inexpensive, South African employers are also attracted to 
foreign Zimbabwean nationals because they are more skilled, qualified, flexible, and 
therefore provide higher productivity benefits compared to indigenous labour.  
A big problem with this set up is that it has caused a lot of social unrests and violent 
xenophobic attitudes and attacks by local South Africans on foreign nationals particularly 
Zimbabweans. The local South Africans claim foreigners are taking over not only their 
jobs, but also their livelihoods, resources, and potential spouses whom the foreigners 
marry at the expense of the locals. So violent were some of the xenophobic attacks that 
they led to the killing of 62 foreigners, and displacement of between 80 000 and 200 000 
people in 2008 (Landau and Wa Kabwe-Segatti, 2009). Development experts project that 
if unaddressed, xenophobic attacks on foreign nationals and the problem of 
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unemployment among the historically disadvantaged youths threaten the country’s 
stability and its potential to foster growth and investment in the region. 
Self-employment and Informal Trade  
 After failing to acquire formal employment on the South African job market, the 
majority of Zimbabwean migrants resort to self-employment and informal trade as an 
alternative way of survival. By nature, Zimbabweans are very hard working, determined 
and creative people who try different channels and any business opportunities that may 
come their way. Examples of self-owned businesses they engage in range from computer 
technology and services, children’s day care services, security, welding, electrical 
engineering, motor mechanics, human resource management, hair dressing salons and 
petty trade (Hungwe, 2013). An on the ground research by Hungwe (2013) showed that 
over 20% of Zimbabwean migrants living in South Africa were involved in self-
employment or some kind of informal trading that was in line with their line of business 
or line of work back-home before coming to South Africa (p. 68). For example, school 
teachers start day care centers, computer and information systems would start 
professional information technology services, and so on. This was how they were able to 
choose a line of business to pursue. Interestingly, other researchers note that Zimbabwean 
migrants start up small business at a higher rate than most foreigners from other countries 
like Nigeria, Tanzania, Congo, and Somalia, including the native South African’s 
(Brettell and Alstaff, 2007 in Hungwe, 213. p.69 ).  
Use of Fake Identification Documents 
 Use of fake identity documents is one common survival strategy used by many 
undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants living in South Africa, particularly to find 
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employment in the formal sector. In an in-depth study of survival tactics used by 
Zimbabwean migrants living in Johannesburg, South Africa, using a random sample size  
of 58 migrants, Hungwe (2013) noted that a considerable number of migrants used fake 
South African identity books. These identity books are typically stolen, “lost and found,” 
or purchased or used sometimes with consent (with terms and conditions that may also 
benefit the bona fide identity book owner) from other South African Citizens then only 
the photo on the original identity book is removed and replaced with a photo of the 
undocumented immigrant (Hungwe, 2013 p. 59-60). The falsified identity book holder 
will then use all the identification details on that bank book including the name and 
identification numbers of the previous owner. In the study carried out in Johannesburg, it 
was discovered that some employers actually offer such fake identity books to 
undocumented immigrants and use that to keep the undocumented employees hooked on 
the low paying job and harsh working conditions.  
 With growing desperation to acquire residency or worker’s permits, some corrupt 
officials of the South African Department of Home Affairs are in many cases involved in 
the production of fake documents through a whole chain of legit, but corrupt channels. 
Sometimes the individuals are also given South African names, have their year and place 
of birth altered, and then in many cases learn to speak the South African languages to 
become conversant like a real South African. The kind of documents produced this way 
are often more difficult for the police to detect authenticity as they are produced by the 
right offices with official stamps. Hungwe (2013) noted that because the process involved 
a chain of corrupt officials to produce a final fake document, the process was often costly, 
involving amounts ranging from R4, 000 to R10, 000 (about USD400-1000 at the 
exchange rate of 1USD to R10) (p. 59). Although the practice of falsified identification is 
71 
 
common, the South African government is now aware of this illegal practice and 
embarked on a drive to arrest any fake identity book holders, making this practice less 
popular among immigrants for fear of arrest and immediate deportation (Hungwe, 2013. 
p. 59-60). 
 Crime  
Crime in South Africa is a concern and it is a known fact that the country has a 
violent crime epidemic stemming from violent oppression and racist historical apartheid 
legislation (Harris, 2001). However, the dominant crime narrative has become linked to 
immigrants as the core perpetrators. Zimbabweans are known for petty theft and robberies 
in and around Johannesburg and Nigerians are known for illicit drug dealing and 
prostitution rackets. It has been established by the South African Police Services (SAPS) 
that this criminal activity has become a livelihood strategy mostly for undocumented 
Zimbabweans migrants (Irin News, 2010). Zimbabwean immigrants involved in theft and 
other criminal activities mainly do so for resale of the stolen goods. Goods that are known 
to have substantial resale value like cell phones, tablets, televisions and other household 
electrical goods are targeted. Resale of such goods at cheap prices raises quick cash that is 
used for daily subsistence.  
Zimbabweans are also actively involved in criminal rackets that deal with fake 
documentation.  The failure by the South African government to tactfully engage its 
regional partners in coming up with a migration policy that creates an open platform for 
migrants to declare their statuses and an enhanced regional documentation regime has led 
to the rise in criminal activity of this kind. For instance, for 500 Rand a migrant can 
access a fake permit that allows them to go undetected at many checkpoints. Also because 
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of tight-knit social networks, information about who has access to a DHA official travels 
fast and migrants will pay amounts ranging from 500-5000 rand (Hungwe, 2013). The 
money to pay for these documents comes in the form of loans from relatives in the 
diaspora namely the United Kingdom, United States, Canada and Australia. Sometimes 
the migrants work menial jobs despite having superior qualifications so that they can raise 
the capital for purchasing the fake documentation. However, completely blaming crime 
on migrants is tantamount to oversight. South Africa social and cultural fabric is 
characterized by a history of widespread and embedded criminality fostered by rogue 
elements in the apartheid system. 
Marriage 
Zimbabwean migrants have also resorted to “sham marriages” as a survival 
strategy to get legal documentation to remain legal in South Africa. Evidently, a corrupt 
and an inefficient documentation regime characterized by many logistical backlogs and 
long waiting periods, has fuelled the rise of “sham or fake” marriages. Sham marriages 
are those unions where a man and woman enter into a legal union recognized under the 
law of that country, but under false pretences. In South Africa these shame marriages 
have distinct variations. The first is the common type, were the woman is ‘supposedly’ 
the citizen and consents to being paid to enter into a fake matrimonial marriage. This is 
then used by the male party to lodge applications for permanent residence or a work 
permit. Zimbabweans, Nigerians, and other migrants from other African countries have 
been cited in many studies as engaging in this criminal act.  
The Second marriage fraud involved Department of Home Affairs officials that 
randomly create marriage licences with random unsuspecting South African women that 
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would have been accessed in the Department’s electronic national registration portal 
(Lafraniere, 2004). In simple terms these unsuspecting women are married unknowingly. 
As of 2004, the Department of Home Affairs publicly acknowledged a breach in the 
system operated by corrupt officials for financial gain. Lafraniere notes that in 2004, an 
estimated 3387 women were married off without their knowledge. The whole process 
cost an equivalent of $US 750, which was approximately 8000 Rand in South African 
currency. As such migrants have exploited some criminal elements in the beleaguered 
South African Home Affairs Department to gain legal status, which they would never get 
through a legitimate application process. In the Freestate Province, 39 Department of 
Home Affairs officials were dismissed for being part of a fake marriage racket 
(Lafraniere, 2004). The argument that the Department of the Home Affairs ministry is 
compromised becomes apparent as reports of corruptions and fraud start surfacing. This 
further strengthens the argument in this study that the problem lies in rigid immigration 
policies, which have not been reformed and have failed in their attempt to regulate 
immigrants. In fact, it is partially this rigidity that promotes criminality and clandestine 
attempts by migrants to regularize their statuses. 
Undocumented Migrants 
This section forms the core of the discussion surrounding undocumented migrants 
and livelihood regimes. Earlier sections helped illuminate who the undocumented 
migrants are and what triggered them to end up in the precarious situation that they are in. 
Following this trajectory, focus shall now turn to a comprehensive analysis of how the 
process of being undocumented unfolds prior to and after migrating. Being undocumented 
is not the ideal that most Zimbabwean migrants want to be in but it is a condition that 
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they are lured into by circumstances beyond their control. Using substantiated evidence, 
the relationship that is characteristic of illegality and the impact it has on the migrant, the 
family and the quality of their livelihood will be explored. This will provide a collective 
analysis of the broader development issues that restrictive immigration policies create, 
such as precarity and economic segregation based along the lines of the concept of 
citizenship. Using the historical background discussed in chapter two, the soundness and 
or comprehensiveness of the immigration policy and its lack of clarity on the unique case 
of Zimbabwean migrant flows will be queried. 
Each country, and, in some instances, economic zones (a group of countries with 
trade agreements), have stipulated requirements for gaining access to that country or 
countries. Normally to be allowed into a country where they are not citizens, immigrants 
need visas or permits. Prior to 1994, South Africa was fortified by restrictive immigration 
policies that did not recognize Africans as immigrants, but as temporary labourers 
(Landau, 2010). As such gaining citizenship or permanent residence status was virtually 
impossible for the African immigrant. However, the coming of independence led to a few 
changes that saw a huge surge in the numbers of African migrants landing into South 
Africa. This surge included both legal and illegal arrivals. It is also important to highlight 
that for this thesis, undocumented refers to asylum seekers, refugees, and illegal 
immigrants. This broad categorization of being undocumented stems from the fact that 
the law, in most instances, especially in South Africa, treats these groups of people the 
same due to their lack of citizenship rights, which renders them aliens. Thus, it is equally 
important to also analyse the trajectories that result in migrants becoming undocumented.  
In the case of Zimbabweans going into South Africa, the focus lies on proper 
documentation at the “source,” which is the Zimbabwean Home Affairs department, 
75 
 
which issues travel documents. It takes between US$ 315- $ 253 to apply for a passport 
that should come out in 1-3 days (Zimdev, 2014).  This is the most recent cost and 
waiting period after major upgrades to the documentation system. At the peak of the 
exodus in 2002 and 2008, the old system was ineffective, often taking months to get a 
passport. In addition, the high demand of passports during these times meant backlogs of 
applications to be processed usually delaying the travellers. Without employment and 
sound access to finance, getting a passport in Zimbabwe was a complicated process and 
still very unaffordable to the ordinary citizen displaced during farm invasions and 
operation “Murambatsvina.” The median monthly salary for the average Zimbabwean is 
around $US 253 and around 30% of the population is employed (Hobbes, 2014). The 
question is how then were the majority of people under severe economic stress able to 
afford such high fees to obtain travel documents in time to escape the extent of hunger 
faced in 2008? Furthermore, there is one South African consulate in Harare, the capital of 
Zimbabwe, which processes travel documents for the massive numbers of potential 
migrants. It is such conditions that force the majority of Zimbabwean migrants to 
clandestinely cross the border into South Africa illegally, so that they can work cheap 
menial jobs, remit money to feed their families and pay for proper documentation. As 
such, the lack of documentation begins right at the source. This study later addresses how 
a regional policy in the SADC region has been implemented to try and deal with some of 
these problems discussed above. 
While it is difficult and relatively expensive to access travel documents in 
Zimbabwe, the process is expected to be less tedious and more affordable in a relatively 
more stable economy like South Africa compared to that of Zimbabwe. With a well-
funded Home Affairs department boasting an estimated 2014/15 budget of 6.6 billion 
76 
 
Rand (about USD 530 million), and a massive restructuring and modernizing exercise, 
domestic documentation of new births and national identification cards has been a 
resounding success  (DHA, 2014).  
However, this success has not been translated to immigrants with the issuance of 
legal documentation, which has remained unstructured and characterized by policy 
discord (Landau, 2010). Zimbabweans keep showing up at the South African Department 
of Home Affairs to submit applications and most of them are turned away. Asylum and 
permanent residency applications for Zimbabweans are often delayed by months or years, 
leading to frustration of applicants (Landau 2010, p. 66).For a process that the DHA 
claims to take about 3 weeks, most applicants have cited their frustration as they have had 
to wait for months leading to them becoming illegals due to decisions that are pending 
(Hungwe, 2013). Hence, they are stuck with no work or the ability to travel. In addition, 
the community-policing regime that has been advocated for previously leads to social 
fragmentation as police and locals take it upon themselves to attack foreign nationals 
believed to be undocumented. There is numerous evidence that shows xenophobic 
sentiments in the South African Police Service itself. For instance, a 2006 survey 
highlighted that only 35% of the South African Police (SAPS) in metro Johannesburg had 
received training on diversity and racism (Masuku, 2006, p. 20). According to this survey, 
almost 87 % believed undocumented immigrants were involved in criminal activity 
(Masuku 2006, p.21). As such, the police force itself contributes to xenophobic sentiment 
which then spills to the communities they police making life for undocumented migrants 




Clearly, the immigration policy focus is on the wellbeing of South Africans, it 
however downplays the development potential that migrants bring to South Africa. The 
inability of the DHA to reform on the position of migrants is a cause for concern, 
especially from a development perspective. Both the DHA and the Gauteng provincial 
government have been cited on the record proclaiming that their mandates were aimed at 
creating socio-economic growth and inclusivity regardless of one’s place of origin 
(Landau, 2005, p. 1). This, however, has not been reflected in their actions on the ground, 
as migrants especially the undocumented continue to face public harassment from law 
enforcement agents, local populations and also the continued denial of their legal rights 
under the 1996 constitution. 
As such, it is important at this point in this study to explore the developmental issues 
associated with being an undocumented immigrant and how that shapes livelihood 
regimes for Zimbabweans in South Africa. In simpler terms, the goal is addressing the 
current living and working conditions that Zimbabweans experience because of not being 
properly documented. 
According to the Immigration Act 13 of 2002, South African businesses that 
employ foreigners are liable to a heavy fine should they be found harbouring illegal 
foreign workers. If the workers are found to be working illegally, they are arrested and 
detained pending deportation (Immigration Act, 2002). Deportation and community 
policing have been South Africa’s two most preferred strategies when dealing with illegal 
Zimbabweans.  An estimated total of 700 000 Zimbabweans where deported between 
2004 and 2009 (Ukuthula Trust and Solidarity Peace Trust, 2010, p. 19). 
This deportation strategy was a massive failure financially, as deportation would 
not deter the Zimbabweans who had clandestine means of getting back into the country 
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within days (Human Rights Watch, 2006). Through numerous interviews with some 
undocumented Zimbabwean migrants, Human Right Watch (HRW) researchers show 
how Zimbabwean migrants are ill-treated during the deportation process and how quickly 
they return to South Africa once handed to the Zimbabwean immigration authorities. In 
one of the interviews, the undocumented migrant highlighted his deportation and the 
extract below shows the how desperate the migrants become in their bid to remain in 
South Africa, and also how easy it is to enter South Africa undetected. 
I arrived in Musina (South Africa border town) on Tuesday morning.  They 
deported us to Beitbridge from the Musina station. In Beitbridge police station 
[Zimbabwe], we were kept there 20 minutes.  We were told to go home.  There was no 
paper work.…  From there we tried to come back on Thursday and we were caught.  
There were about 15 in our group.  Most in the group were those who were deported.… 
On Thursday around 1 a.m. we crossed the border.  From the border crossing point, we 
walked from 1 a.m. to 5 a.m.… We hired a car in Musina.  It was around 1 p.m.  
(Human Rights Watch, 2006) 
 
The above is but one of the many cases of thousands of migrants from Zimbabwe 
who return after being deported from South Africa. Clearly, in this instance the 
deportation exercise was futile, as it became a very expensive exercise for the South 
African government (Human Rights Watch, 2006). South Africa has a vast border, which 
stretches an estimated 3,500 kilometers and is shared with Botswana, Namibia, 
Mozambique, Lesotho, Swaziland and Zimbabwe (Hennop et al, 2001). Unlike the 
Apartheid era when the South African National Defense Forces (SANDF) used to run the 
border patrol, the independent democratic dispensation under Thabo Mbeki disbanded the 
SANDF border services and replaced them with South African Police Services (SAPS) 
(Landau, 2010). The SAPS have been ineffective as they are poorly funded and this has 
opened the vast border lines to abuse by illegal immigrants.  
79 
 
The deportation strategy dismally failed to yield any significant reduction in the 
influx of undocumented migrants. In fact, it partially strengthened the resolve of 
undocumented migrants to enter and avoid detection. As such, when referring to the 
influx of Zimbabweans as a survival strategy, one cannot overlook the dangers that the 
migrants face during the journey into South Africa only to be faced with an uncertain 
livelihood regime and constant xenophobic sentiments. In as much as the migrants might 
desire to follow the legitimate channels of immigration, it takes too much of their meager 
resources, and the waiting times are unrealistic for a people on the verge of destitution 
and starvation. Hence, their lifeline becomes border jumping, as it is referred to in 
Southern Africa. 
Furthermore, these illegal immigrants due to securitization measures enshrined in 
South Africa’s immigration legislation (Immigration Act of 2002) cannot access: i) 
educational institutions; ii) vital financial institutions (banks)-  meaning no access credit 
facilities, real estate, and employment agencies (Landau, 2010). Anyone found to be 
aiding illegals in any form deemed illegal is subject to doing extensive jail time, and as 
such, the environment for the undocumented migrant is suffocating. This bring us to the 
issue of livelihood trajectories that undocumented migrants end up adopting for survival 
despite all the draconian measures meant to exclude them from participating in the South 
African economy. The question is how are the undocumented migrants navigating the 
economic landscape and what are their conditions of existence like from a development 
context? 
As the South African economy continues to struggle from effects of the global 
crisis, unemployment (26, 7%) is at an all-time high (STATSSA, 2016). Manufacturing 
jobs are on the decline and more South Africans are being pushed into the growing 
80 
 
informal sector. Informalization according to Crush et al (2010) has become rampant and 
as unemployment rises, many South Africans are finding livelihoods in the informal 
sector. However, the informal sector is also heavily crowded with migrants both legal and 
undocumented. Zimbabwean, Malawian, Somali, and Nigerian immigrants among others 
have swarmed the Johannesburg inner city informal markets and are very competitive in 
their entrepreneurial enterprises. Despite massive clampdowns by law enforcement agents 
on some of these foreign owned informal small businesses, they do create livelihood 
regimes for otherwise unemployable and undocumented migrants. It is true that, not all 
migrants are enterprising to the extent of starting flourishing informal businesses, the 
majority are poor and have no skills to compete in a politically charged environment 
characterized by soaring xenophobic sentiments. 
A Journey Man (2008) video documents the gruesome conditions that most 
undocumented migrants live and work in. The documentary portrays illegal migrants in 
the Fordsburg area of Johannesburg working in ‘sweat shops” are in appalling conditions. 
The undocumented workers work longer hours (18 hour days) and under dangerous 
conditions. Some of these workers reside in the factories with their families out of fear of 
apprehension due to their illegal status, limiting their mobility (Journey Man Pictures, 
2008). These workers are paid as, and when, the owner deems is suitable. For two weeks 
of 18 hour long days, the workers report receiving 250 (Rands)7 which is an equivalent of 
18 USD (Journey Man Pictures, 2008). This is just but one case highlighting the atrocious 
conditions of survival that undocumented workers are faced with. Numerous other 
                                                      
7 Rand is the South African currency 
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examples within Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town’s inner cities have highlighted 
even worse living conditions.  
The question, however is what creates these forms of exploitative conditions? It 
leads back to the question of securitization of legislation that equips the system with 
draconian laws that impede human development, all in the interests of a few “elites” who 
use the politics of fear to advance their own political agendas. The Gauteng provincial 
government has acknowledged the need to create an economic environment that fosters 
the development of all citizens of Gauteng by developing livelihood activities for its 
citizens and by creating a conducive and civil environment for both non-nationals and 
nationals to co-exist harmoniously. The first call to action was their information drive. 
Research was documented a lack of knowledge on proper immigration protocol that 
undocumented migrants could access to know where to get assistance with immigration 
issues. The Gauteng provincial government set up call centers and funding was rolled out 
to partner with other civic organizations in their drive to bring awareness on the 
importance of getting legal documentation. This initiative however did not last as some 
within the ruling African National Congress felt it was ineffective and wasteful of 
resources (Landau, 2010). 
In South Africa, research shows that most migrants have a more relentless passion 
towards entrepreneurial activity to improve their livelihoods (Landau, 2010, Crush & 
Frayne, 2010). Also, migrants are prepared to work any type of low paying jobs to put a 
meal on the table for their families and they tend to adapt faster to economic stress than 
locals. However, in the South African context they are accused of lowering wages, which 
is also, where some of the xenophobic sentiments stem from (Landau, 2010). 
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Considering all this knowledge on the conditions of undocumented migrants in 
South Africa, the government has been ineffective in dealing with the issue of 
undocumented migrant influxes from Zimbabwe. Since the year 2000 up until 2016, there 
has not been clear policy on how to address the Zimbabwe undocumented migrant crisis. 
Several temporary and reactionary measures were put in place but without a defined 
proposal that would address the situation in all its totality. Documenting an estimated 
250000 Zimbabwean migrants when research shows that their numbers exceed a million 
leaves one to question why there has been no effective planning for the unique 
Zimbabwean situation. It is therefore important to look at the legislation in the form of the 
immigration law to look at the evolution of the Immigration rules and laws in post- 
Apartheid South Africa. This will allow us to understand the State haggling, inadequate 
and unresponsive action concerning the plight of migrants, especially those from 
Zimbabwe, which seem to be the immediate threat to their socio-economic system. 
This section illustrated the nature of the problems Zimbabweans are facing in their 
home country that caused them to migrate to South Africa in large numbers. However, 
due to the restrictive and exclusionary immigration policy in South Africa their hopes of a 
better life have been elusive. Zimbabwean migrants living in South Africa have 
precarious livelihoods stemming from their undocumented status. They are pushed to the 
margins of the employment market characterized by low wages and exploitation. As such, 
the migrants have adopted a variety of livelihood strategies to cater for their families and 
those left in their country of origin. However, it should also be noted that the South Africa 
government has tried to institute changes to their immigration laws, though not successful 
enough to stabilize its current migration problem especially with Zimbabweans. Chapter 
4, addresses immigration policy responses by the South African government from 1995 -
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2015, with the intent to show the evolution of the legislation and how some exclusionary 








































                                                 Chapter 4: South African Immigration Policy Responses 
(1995-2015) 
 
South African Immigration Policy Responses (1995-2015) 
 
Introduction 
This chapter discusses post-independent South Africa’s immigration policy responses. 
The goal is to further trace the continued reliance on restrictive policies that were 
instituted by the colonial and apartheid regimes. Crucial will be the documenting the 
unconstitutionality of some sections of the immigration policy that had been rendered 
obsolete by adoption of the new Bill of Rights adopted in 1995. The new South Africa 
presented new challenges for the new African National Congress (ANC) government 
from an immigration perspective. The Alien act of 1991 became an outdated piece of 
legislation due to its divergence from the new constitution of the republic (Wa Kabwe-
Segatti, 2006). To further tighten the positions put into effect by the Aliens Act of 1991, 
the Aliens Control Amendment Act was gazetted in 1995. 
After gaining independence in 1994, South Africa had the tenuous task of creating 
an immigration legislation that would conform to the non-racial nation building that 
Nelson Mandela passionately advocated for. Despite this new direction towards 
inclusivity for all, the Minister of Home Affairs then, Mongosuthu Buthelezi, would go 
on to continue the further political hardening of immigration instituted by the last 
apartheid leader, De Klerk. 
The 1995 Aliens Control Amendment Act continued being segregationist against 
black foreigners from other parts of Africa. For instance, immigrant selection was based 
on qualification and skills, showing the desire by the new ANC government to only 
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attract a certain kind of immigrant considered desirable, while barring the majority. Crush 
and Williams note that, “policy strongly favoured skilled migrants from Europe and the 
West (2001, p.11). In 1995, 65% of work permits went to Europeans, 12% to North 
Americans and only 8% to citizens of the 12 SADC states (Crush and Williams, 2001, 
p.11)”. This was a clear indication of the protectionist and segregationist stance that the 
new South African government adopted to keep out African populations coming from 
surrounding SADC countries. 
 During his tenure, Mongosuthu Buthelezi (the then Minister of Home Affairs for 
South Africa), commissioned the Department of Home Affairs to strengthen restrictions, 
especially against undocumented immigrants. Migrant workers in the mining and 
agriculture sectors remained under their apartheid contract based immigration, which 
meant that they could not become permanent residents. Detentions and deportation were 
given a boost under this Act, and community policing went into effect (Peberdy and 
Crush, 1998). 
 In a gesture of goodwill, in 1996, the South African government gave amnesty to 
African migrants who had lived and worked in the Republic of South Africa for more 
than five years (Peberdy and Crush, 1998). The amnesty was meant to make it easier for 
this group of migrants to acquire documentation that would ensure their stay was 
regularized. However, with the passage of time, there was increased discontent about the 
unconstitutionality of some aspects of the immigration legislation and inquiry was set into 
motion to have new immigration legislation within a manageable time frame. Despite the 
obstructionism coming from the ANC, then Minister Buthelezi eventually came up with 
new recommendations for amendments of the 1995 immigration Act, which were adopted 
in 2002 (Crush and Dodson, 2006. p. 436). 
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For purposes of this study, focus is on following the trajectory of changes in South 
Africa’s immigration laws, highlighting how these changes worsened or improved the 
apartheid inspired immigration restrictions and the actual implications for the 
“undesirable groups” of immigrants, who were the majority. Following the 1995 
Immigration Amendment Act, years went by without new immigration reforms. This 
meant continued community policing which led to numerous violations of human rights 
violations on immigrants and the increase of xenophobic violence in the townships where 
foreign black populations lived (Wa Kabwe-Segatti, 2006).  The migrants did not possess 
any legal rights and were subject to unlawful detentions and inhumane treatment during 
the deportation process.  
 The Minister had absolute power to make decisions on immigration at his 
discretion (Wa Kabwe-Segatti, 2006. p. 178). Deportations were the order of the day. 
Numerous reports showed undocumented immigrants faced unprecedented abuse from 
law enforcement agents during that period (Wa Kabwe-Segatti, 2006). Meanwhile, during 
this period, before the passing of the new immigration Act of 2002, Zimbabwe’s 
economic woes had intensified. The situation was made worse by the fact that South 
Africa was concentrating on operating on archaic immigration legislation without bearing 
in mind a looming intensified influx of Zimbabwean migrants, which the South African 
government did not anticipate. 
The Green Paper (1997) and the White Paper (1999) 
The Green and White papers were attempts by the South African government to 
transform their immigration legislation. These policy papers called on all civil society to 
discuss and forward feasible policy position that could be further refined into law. 
87 
 
In what is referred to as the lost decade of immigration (1994-2004), a legislative 
reform process was launched, which would culminate in a new Immigration Act (Crush 
and Dodson, 2006). This process would produce the draft “green and white” papers on 
immigration, with the former preceding the latter in the South Africa system. The Green 
paper is that first draft of a new policy tabled for public consultation and other 
stakeholders. The White paper contains detailed proposals for legislation.  
The initial observation that stands out in the 1997 Green Paper is the changing 
language, which morphed from a racist and segregationist tone to a much more 
nationality-oriented position (Centre for Development Enterprise (CDE), 1997). This was 
signaling a shift from an apartheid position, which discriminated against immigrants on 
racial grounds replacing it with an all-inclusive regulatory framework.  
 Unlike the 1991 Aliens Act and the 1995 Immigration Amendment Act, the 1997 
Green Paper focused on four major attributes that would contribute to a progressive and 
effective immigration policy framework. The focus of immigration policy according to 
the Green paper would be to: 
“ (a) to enhance the country’s integration into, and competitiveness within the global 
economy; (b) to further the process of regional integration and development within the 
Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) (c) to generate macro-economic growth 
and employment opportunities in the formal and informal sectors, as outlined in the 
Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) framework; and (d) to provide improved 
living standards for our people”(Department of Home Affairs, Green Paper, 1997. p. 13). 
 
In an ideal scenario, the above goals, if achieved, would aid in creating a 
developed national economy that has a global, regional and local appeal. Surprisingly, 
some of the Green Paper points outlined above only appeared on this paper, and were not 
incorporated into the new legislation. As the deadlines effected by the Constitutional 
court to revise the Aliens Act of 1991 approached, some of the major issues raised in the 
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Green Paper were set aside as the ANC, its elite, and other members of the Tripartite 
Alliance (SACP and COSATU) conjured up amendments that added more restrictions to 
the proposed Bill (Wa Kabwe-Segatti, 2006). For example, the remnants of senior white 
officials in the Department of Home Affairs, who were playing an advisory role to the 
ANC, submitted what Crush and McDonald (2001) called a chilling communiqué that 
called for a bold declaration of war against undocumented immigrants, characterizing 
them as “one of the country's major social and economic plagues," which require 
“draconian measures” to deal with (p. 10). Clearly, with immigration advice coming from 
apartheid ideologues, the chances of immigration reform were temporarily halted. 
Obstructionism and power brokering have no doubt been complicit in creating the 
policy discord that characterizes immigration in South Africa. The obstructionism 
referred to here, is that which saw influential political figureheads in South Africa’s 
tripartite alliance composed of the African national Congress (ANC), Congress of South 
African Trade Unions (COSATU) and South African Communist Party (SACP) refuse to 
overhaul legislation over fear of being engulfed by foreigners (Wa Kabwe-Segatti, 2006. 
p. 183). In another important policy position, South Africa categorically denounced any 
chance of bilateral agreement between Southern African countries to create a free 
mobility zone that resembles that of the European Union (Green Paper, 1997). Instead, 
South Africa opted to carry out its own screening of migrants, citing wealth disparities 
that would fuel increased competition for opportunities, which would disadvantage South 
African nationals.  
As such, there are some “positives and negatives” that the Green Paper 1997 
brought to the fore in the bid to create a sound policy position on immigration. These, 
however, cannot all be discussed here. The focus is to draw on those aspects of the 
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policies that contribute to the disenfranchisement of undocumented migrants. 
Consequently, further refinement of the Green Paper culminated in the creation of the 
White Paper, which also was problematic overall. The Lawyers for Human Rights (LHR) 
responded with sharp criticism on some the propositions tabled in this paper. First, the 
Lawyers for Human Rights were concerned that the White Paper failed to adequately 
address the issue concerning human rights afforded to non-South Africans. They cited a 
few areas of concern pertaining to i) border control ii) training of immigration officials 
and xenophobia (LHR, 1999).  
During the period under analysis, South Africa considered opting out of border 
control to border management. The point of order that the Lawyers for Human Rights 
raised was that, though it was plausible to forward recommendation on how to transition 
from border control to management it should also be something done with a policy to 
guide its implementation (LHR, 1999). This observation has some credibility in that there 
are major logistical backlogs in the implementation of more recent border management 
controls. In addition, corrupt officials have soiled the image of the institution that is 
supposed to create fluid legal relationships with immigrants.  
The White Paper 1998-1999 uses language that seems to condemn 
“discrimination” against any person, which aligns with the constitution. However, in 
addressing the undocumented migrant question, the White Paper recommended making 
South Africa unattractive to would be migrants (LHR, 1999). In other words, South 
Africa wanted to tighten legislation to have a gridlocked employment market, which was 
accessible to citizens first. Also, added to this would be increased policing, to close all the 
loopholes that undocumented migrant might have access to. It should be noted that this 
strategy was one of the main causes of the disruptions in livelihoods in most informal 
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settlements when xenophobic violence first erupted. For instance, towards the 2010 
Soccer World Cup, the police adopted a zero tolerance approach to crime and because 
attitudes in the South African Police Services (SAPS) attribute crime to migrants, 
Zimbabwean migrants were targeted and arrested. The migrants would be detained for 
long periods of time before being deported (HRW, 2006). Despite the construction job 
boom associated with hosting the Soccer World Cup, most migrants were unable to 
continue work as result of harassment from the police and locals. 
 In addition, the White Paper categorized non-nationals as “undesirables” without 
specifically delineating who was represented by such demeaning terminology (LHR, 
1999). It is such small nuances that evidence a deeply ingrained “us and them” mentality, 
which blinds policy formulation processes and impact development, not only of 
individuals, but communities at large. The White Paper did not wield a powerful position 
to influence change in the approach to addressing the plight of migrants. In all its totality, 
it had the skeletal framework like that of the Alien Act of 1991, which fostered a “we and 
them” position. Both the Green and White papers were never used when it came to 
creation of new legislation. 
The Immigration Act of 2002  
This Act was the result of a controversial process which excluded all the 
recommendation put through both the Green and White Papers. The Tripartite Alliance8 
has been largely held responsible for derailing the possibility of a decent process that 
would have ushered a transformational approach to immigration. The Immigration Act of 
                                                      
8 Tripartite Alliance refers to the pact between the ruling African National Congress (ANC) of South 




2002 repealed the 1991 Aliens Act and the Aliens Amendment Act of 1995. This Act of 
2002 was supposed to be revolutionary in its overhaul of apartheid inspired legislation. 
Instead the Minister, Mongosuthu Buthelezi, gave his office sweeping powers to delegate 
duties concerning immigration to other sections of the Public Service. As such, the 
Department of Home Affairs enlisted the South African Police Service (SAPS), and the 
South African Defense National Forces (SANDF) to conduct arrests, searches and 
deportations. This directive clearly mirrors the tools that the apartheid regime used to 
employ to enforce their brutal crackdown on other races considered inferior (Peberdy and 
Crush 2008).  
 Under the Immigration Act of 2002, there are a few legal stumbling blocks that 
migrants face in an attempt to regularize their documentation for them to get jobs. This 
legislation made it more complicated and time consuming to get legal documentation to 
work in the Republic of South Africa (Human Rights Watch, 2008). 
Furthermore, the Immigration Amendment Act, section 21(4)(b), ended 
employers’ access to special exemptions for the recruitment of foreign workers based on 
ministerial approval, but preserves existing treaties with governments in the region. This 
section highlights the desire by the ANC-led government to close the legal “immigration 
gate,” while maintaining access to cheaper labour. This further reinforces the argument 
that the current immigration legislation bears the hallmarks of discriminatory apartheid 
inspired positions.  
 As mentioned earlier, not all migrants enter South Africa illegally. Some become 
illegal immigrants under a variety of circumstances. For example, since the 
documentation is temporary, when the documentation expires, and upon renewal, the 
DHA is highly inefficient in renewing the documents. This inefficiency has been seen as 
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a tactic to keep people in an undocumented state, and explained through the concept of 
“institutionalized illegality” (Klaaren and Ramji, 2001, p.38). This concept can be likened 
to that of Spain, were the Spanish government makes it very difficult for migrants from 
Africa to renew their status (Klaaren and Ramji, 2001, p.38). Because of this approach, 
the host government slowly disposes large numbers of people into illegality taking away 
any rights they might have had as documented migrants. 
Long queues and long wait times have been a consistent point of contention from 
most applicants, forcing some immigrants to be illegal by default due to system 
inefficiencies (Rasool, Botha and Bisschof, 2012. p. 405). With a renewal application 
tendered, one is required to stop working until they are issued with new documentation. 
Subsequently, there are running battles between undocumented immigrants and law 
enforcement personnel, who will arrest and deport anyone suspected of being an illegal 
immigrant. In most cases when migrants encounter law enforcement agents, they do not 
have a chance to furnish evidence, which explains why they do not possess the required 
travel or immigration documents. 
            In addition, the required documentation for one to submit a successful application 
keeps changing. For instance, before one can submit all the supporting documents to their 
application, they need to furnish a police clearance for every country they have stayed in 
for at least one year (Rasool, Botha and Bisschof, 2012). Some of these people can barely 
afford bus fare to go and submit the application. The expectations are simply unrealistic. 
Such small impediments create difficulties for migrants in the quest to regularize their 
status in South Africa. As such, some of the legal requirements need to be revised to 
make it less complicated for the applicants. 
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For example, under the stipulations of this Immigration Act of 2002, for a migrant 
to start a small business, one needs to have capital to invest. This capital contributes to the 
overall application for a business permit. However, the amount that is requested by the 
DHA is unreasonably high (5 million rand or US 350 000), which most migrant 
entrepreneurs cannot afford (Rasool, Botha and Bisschof, 2012; South African 
Immigration, 2016). Most undocumented migrants have limited skills and their informal 
businesses do not need that much capital. As such, this requirement is highly 
unreasonable to both those that can afford it and those that cannot. 
Although the 2002 Immigration Act removed most of the racial undertones 
characteristic of the apartheid era, it remained restrictive in that it inhibits most African 
migrants from participating in the economy. Rather, it channels migrants into precarious 
roles characterized by low wages and exploitation. Institutions like the Lawyers for 
Human Rights believe that these restrictions have made a significant contribution to the 
clandestine migration that the government is trying to reduce. This is because migrants, in 
desperate need of survival, develop creative strategies and find ways of manipulating the 
repressive system in a way that eludes the legal channels and resorts to “border jumping” 
or corruption to buy their way across the borders.  
Since the Immigration Act of 2002, there has not been a significant overhaul of 
the South African immigration policy. A few amendments were made in 2005 and 2014, 
but did not address the reality of the immigration problems besieging South Africa, 
especially the Zimbabwean problem. There are still numerous migrants that applied to the 
DHA, who either have not received correspondence, or are still awaiting responses.  
The petty corruption that each new Minister of Home Affairs pledges to eradicate 
has become a highly efficient and lucrative crime syndicate (Landau, 2010. p. 71). The 
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corruption is out in the public domain, for instance, 83 people were arrested in 2016, of 
which 42 were officials of the department and 41 were non-officials (van Wyngaardt, 
2016). They operated a syndicate of fake documentation targeting desperate 
Zimbabweans. It should be noted that these corrupt activities are not new: even during 
apartheid fake document syndicates existed. 
 Such bureaucratic hurdles in the immigration system have contributed to a 
complex socio-political environment difficult to navigate, for both documented and 
undocumented migrants. For example, the longer waiting times and documentation 
demands translate to lengthy periods of unemployment and reduced income, which has 
ripple effects on the immigrants’ livelihoods and well-being of their families back home 
as it affects remittances that would otherwise help those that remained in countries of 
origin. However, it would be inaccurate to fail to acknowledge that the South African 
government through the DHA has made progress in some areas, especially abandoning 
their community-policing program, which overtly created vigilantes and perpetuated 
xenophobic violence.  
Notably, the DHA went on to create special a dispensation for Zimbabweans in 
South Africa in a bid to document the many undocumented Zimbabweans so that they can 
legally work and improve their income and livelihoods.  The two dispensations will 
further be discussed after the section below. 
The Immigration Amendment Act of 2011 and 2014 
The Immigration Act of 2011 was an amendment of the Immigration Act of 2002. 
This Act did not diverge from the positions that characterized the 2002 Act. In fact, it 
added more restrictions in a bid to make South Africa unattractive to migrants. Notable 
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changes included the repealing of the Quota work permit and the Exceptional skills visa, 
which were merged to create the Critical Skills visa. This signaled a protectionist stance 
by the government to try to limit the number of foreign migrants entering the labour 
force. The positions in the Amendment Act of 2011 resemble the restrictions that were 
instituted against Jewish immigrant in the Aliens Act of 1937, which was an attempt to 
protect the white labour market against Jewish migrants. As such, I argue as shown in this 
study that there is a continued remodeling of immigration legislation based on historic 
racist positions.     
 Section 20 (c) of the Amendment Act of 2011 added a clause that penalized 
migrants that overstayed the time stipulated on their visas ( Republic of South Africa, 
2011). Considering the known logistical and organizational problems that plague the 
Department of Home Affairs (DHA), there is evidence of periodic delays in renewal of 
visas. As such, most migrants who are the majority on temporary visas run the risk of 
becoming “undesirables” and facing deportation from South Africa. This move, although 
meant to enforce strict rules of stay in South Africa, also contributes to the problem by 
supporting the creation of undocumented aliens due to the inefficiency of the 
documentation systems. 
The Amendment Act of 2014 was aggressive in its exclusion agenda. The 
Department of Home Affairs contracted a private company, VFS Global, to handle all 
visa related applications. This not only makes it difficult for applicants to appeal but also 
shifts the handling of application traffic from the DHA to VFS Global. Such a move was 
meant to deter corrupt administration rackets from handling applications and direct 
contact with migrants. The move cost South Africa an estimated 4.4 billion Rand in 
tourism revenue in 2014-2015 because of the expenses and inconveniences faced by 
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would be migrants and tourists (Eisenberg, 2015). Furthermore, Eisenberg notes the rate 
at which applications for work permits and permanent residence are denied is alarming 
and sometimes no satisfactory reasons are given (2015). This leads applicants to file 
appeals, which can last between 5-6 months. During this adjudication process most 
applicants automatically become ‘undesirables’, as per the Immigration Act. 
 The Amendment Act of 2014 virtually makes it “impossible” for migrant worker to 
access formal employment. Section 18 (3) a) 1 stipulates that for one to get a work visa, 
there must be a certificate from the Department of Labour confirming that- (i) despite a 
diligent search, the prospective employer has been unable to find a suitable citizen or 
permanent resident with qualifications or skills and experience equivalent to those of the 
applicant. Eisenberg notes the Department of labour does not support employment of 
migrants; hence, it is difficult for a migrant worker to get endorsement (2015).  
It is understandable that governments are supposed to look out for the interests of 
their citizens first before foreigners. The South African case presents notable points to 
reflect on, however, in that the country needs skilled migrant labour to remain 
competitive in the international markets (Eisenberg, 2015).  
Dispensation of Zimbabweans Project (DZP) and the Zimbabwean Special 
Dispensation Permit (ZSP) 2010-2014 
The DZP was launched in 2009 after approval by the South African government 
and Department of Home Affairs.  Its mandate was to i) Regularize Zimbabweans 
residing in South Africa “illegally”. ii) Curb the deportation of Zimbabweans who were in 
SA” illegally”. iii) Reduce pressure on the asylum seeker and refugee regime  
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iv) Provide amnesty to Zimbabweans who obtained SA documents fraudulently (Rogers 
and Chanderparsath, 2014. p. 1). This project was also a reaction to the xenophobic 
violence that erupted towards the kickoff of the 2010 Soccer World Cup in South Africa. 
Due to the nature and magnitude of the impending event, South was put under the 
spotlight as they were the hosts.  
The xenophobic violence that erupted was captured around the world and 
questions concerning the capability of South Africa to host the Soccer World cup in such 
an environment were asked. As Zimbabwe was collapsing in 2008, all the undocumented 
labour traffic that poured into South Africa from Zimbabwe created a labour surplus 
which was welcomed for stadium and other infrastructure construction ahead of the 
World Cup (Raftopolos, 2013). However, this excess labour, would need to be regulated 
after the World cup was over because the economic boom that came with the World Cup 
would have dissipated (Cottle and Rambaldi, 2013. p. 4). The fear was that it would result 
in increased competition for jobs and resources causing unprecedented antagonism 
between locals and migrants. 
Under this dispensation, the DHA had received 294,511 applications (242, 731 
were granted, with 51,780 either rejected or not finalised) for DZP permits to work, study 
or conduct business in South Africa (Chiumia and Van Wyk, 2014). This dispensation   
was a massive disappointment in that the numbers of application that were accepted is far 
too small compared to the actual estimates of Zimbabweans thought to be in South 
Africa, which is between 1, 5 to 3 million undocumented Zimbabweans (Chiumia, 2013). 
The number of approved applications is less than a third of the estimated total population, 
and the question to ask is how does DHA address the rest? Zimbabweans did not respond 
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to hand in their fake documents for amnesty because of a lack of trust in the system and 
the operations of the DHA and fear of deportation (Amit, 2012). 
Most Zimbabweans, as mentioned earlier, are accustomed to long queues and 
prolonged waiting periods. Many Zimbabweans were skeptical to get some work is not an 
option as it has direct impact on their livelihood. It was rather suspicious for many 
Zimbabwean migrants as a system that has continuously restricted migrants through 
policing, deportation and xenophobic violence to suddenly change course. Trust in the 
institutions that safe guard the people’s sovereignty is a principle that fosters development 
(Sen, 2000). Adopting the Sen logic, if the Department of Home Affairs was run 
efficiently and policy reforms were carried out in the interest of developing the lives of 
both the citizen and the non-citizen, meaningful development would take place.  
Furthermore, some people in positions of influence have misplaced conceptions about the 
impacts of migrants in South Africa. Those migrants are part of the informal sector, 
which alone contributes an estimated 28 % of GDP (The Times Editorial, January 11, 
2016). From a policy perspective, it is a prerogative for the South African authorities to 
create permanent lasting solutions whose reach aims to empower the marginalized. 
Moving on to the Zimbabwe Special Dispensation Permit (ZSP) (2014), which 
was the successor of the DZP, and a vehicle that the DHA sought to use as a way to 
document and an attempt to regularize Zimbabwean migrants in South Africa (De Jager 
and Musuva, 2016), the purpose of the ZSP was to institute a head count of Zimbabwean 
migrants under the guise of extending their legal documentation that allowed them to 
remain legal in South Africa. Like all its predecessors, the ZSP was an exclusive 
dispensation that sought to restrict a group of migrants. Just as the Immigration Act of 
1913 was set up to bar Indians from inter-provincial movements in the Union, the ZSP 
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had a similar mandate. It sought to enforce conditions that did not allow the holders to 
apply for permanent residency or to renew the permits. Once a Zimbabwean applied and 
was granted this permit they could not change the conditions of the permit (Moyo, 2015). 
There is a peculiar trend visible in this dispensation. It shows a continued pattern 
and positioning that is characteristic to most historic immigration legislation in the post-
apartheid period. The DHA’s argument is that they are giving Zimbabweans a reprieve 
allowing them to remain in the country. This is not however a permanent solution but 
rather temporary one that pushes most Zimbabwean migrants into precarious occupations 
(De Gruchy, 2015).  
The ZSP is solely controlled by VSF- Global an international company contracted 
by the government to process applications (Chiumia and Van Wyk, 2014). The ZSP was 
meant only to benefit those that had successfully applied and received their DZP. 
However, those Zimbabwean migrants that had been rejected in the first dispensation 
were to re-apply under the new ZSP. The outsourcing of the VSF Global was meant to 
increase the efficiency of the application processes and the turn over times that applicants 
had to wait before receiving their decisions. VSF global is a known international 
company that provides its services in many other economically advanced countries like 
Canada, Australia and the United Kingdom. Because of the reputation that VSF Global 
has, it would be logical to expect a change in the service delivery. However, a close look 
at the applications processed from the time of the launch shows no change from how the 
DHA handled the same processes (De Gruchy, 2015).  
Furthermore, the cost of filing an application with VSF Global range between 800 
rand- 1350 rand which is 56-95 US $ (Chiumia and Van Wyk, 2014)). This is clearly a 
price out of reach for most poor Zimbabwean migrants. For instance, a family man with 
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two children and a spouse to apply for this permit will have to pay an estimated 3200 
Rand/ 225 US$ minimum. This is seriously problematic even for visa application for 
international standards. It points again to a form of segregation, which all the other prior 
immigration legislation enforced as well. It means that those who cannot afford to raise 
this much money for application fees will end up illegal. In addition, when the ZSP 
expires in 2017, all those that want to remain in South Africa to work or for school would 
have to reapply from outside South Africa (New World Immigration, 2016). The ZSP 
though it was meant to be a reprieve, certainly was nowhere near a solution. When the 
permits expire come December 2017, Minister Malusi Gigaba reiterated resorting back to 
the Immigration Act, which clearly has an even more restrictive impact on migrants. It is 
this continuous state of precariousness that this thesis sort to address and arguments as 
those above are evidence of a system deeply flawed which places focus nationalistic 
values at the expense of development and human rights. 
In conclusion, since 1994 the South African government has struggled to create an 
immigration legislation regime, which embodies some of the values enshrined in their 
Constitution. The Constitution is considered the most progressive in the world, with a 
Bill of Rights second to none. However, their immigration legislation speaks otherwise. 
As discussed earlier, the implementation of numerous amendments to the Immigration 
Act were halted and challenged for non-conformity with the constitution of the land. 
There is a need for a paradigm shift in the treatment of immigrants. This begins with a 
total overhaul of the immigration legislation that is still influenced by apartheid and pre-
apartheid practices. Migration can be managed effectively, while keeping in mind that 
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migrants are a useful resource that can bring about meaningful development in both the 
host and home country. 
 








This thesis set out to examine South Africa’s immigration policy, specifically how 
it affects the livelihoods of Zimbabwean migrants living in South Africa. Both 
documented and undocumented Zimbabwean immigrants have increasingly faced 
difficulty in regularizing their stay in South Africa resulting in precarious livelihoods.  
Zimbabwean immigrants are a group of interest because they constitute the highest 
number of immigrants in South Africa, as compared to the rest of Africa. The main 
reason for this influx is the continued deterioration of the political and socio-economic 
landscape in Zimbabwe. 
The study shows that despite numerous amendments, South Africa’s Apartheid 
and pre-Apartheid inspired immigration policy remains outdated and exclusionary at the 
core. Tracing the evolution of South Africa’s immigration policy from 1913 to 2016, the 
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study evidences visible remnants of colonialism and apartheid inspired ideas that helped 
shape South Africa’s current migration policy. Through critical literature review, policy 
and document analysis the study found that the South African government is reluctant to 
overhaul its restrictive apartheid inspired immigration laws, while covertly concealing its 
lack of capacity and tact to manage the Zimbabwe migrant situation. 
First, the study shows how migration is a critical development issue in the Global 
South, particularly in Africa, where population movements are exacerbated by incessant 
socio-political and economic crises. The influx of Zimbabweans migrants in South Africa 
presents a complex dilemma in the context of development, where development is here 
defined as, “enhancement of human capabilities, which comes through removal of 
“unfreedoms” like tyranny, poor economic opportunities, systematic social deprivation, 
intolerance and repression by state entities”. (Sen, 1999.p.xii) 
 While the influx of Zimbabwean migrants is clearly putting pressure on South 
Africa’s resources, meant for its citizenry, such as housing, jobs, health care, legal and 
social services, South Africa has some measure of responsibility to ensure that the rights 
of immigrants are respected and that they live a secure comfortable life. Bound by the 
Constitution (1996) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR), South Africa is expected to ensure that “every person living in South 
Africa” has the right to “equality before the law, human dignity, personal freedom and 
security, privacy, due process of law, freedom of expression and association, fair labour 
practices, adequate housing, health care, sufficient food and water, and social security” 
(Human Rights Watch, 2007)  
The study also highlights the complexities of migration in that there is no one 
theoretical position that explains the phenomenon of migration. To understand migration, 
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there is need to incorporate theorization from several fields that include, for example, 
Geography, Economics, Political Science, and Anthropology. However, this study is 
informed by several theories. The earliest one being the push and pull theory presented by 
Ravenstein as the most basic theory in understanding migration that was linked to his 
time. This theory elucidates the presence of forces that influence people to leave their 
communities and those factors that would have drawn them to move. The theory helped 
to explain the reasons behind Zimbabweans flooding into South Africa. The historical 
structural approach, also helped consider historical relationships between Zimbabwe and 
South Africa and analyse forms of capital accumulation that existed. This analysis 
showed that Zimbabwe and South Africa had pre-existing labour –migrant networks that 
were run by both governments using companies like Wenela Teba. Based on this 
approach, most Zimbabweans and their families are naturally drawn to South Africa 
because of the deeply imbedded pre-existing labour –migrant historical links, which are 
further strengthened by a relatively robust economy in the destination country compared 
to the country of origin. In other words, South Africa commands a “pseudo core” status in 
Southern Africa by the size of its economy and relatively advanced infrastructure.  
Furthermore, such economic dimensions that trigger populations to move are also 
explained by the neoclassical theories of migration, also discussed in the introductory 
chapter. This theory also embraces the concept of wage differentials, as envisaged by 
Harris and Todaro, which ascertains that people move to where there is more economic 
gain. As such, this explains the influx of both documented and undocumented 
Zimbabwean migrants who are drawn by the expectation of better wages and working 
conditions across the border. 
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Through historical evidence, the study examines immigration legislation from 
1906 to 1991. The purpose was to incisively focus on each phase of immigration 
legislation highlighting its composition and the driving factors, which led to the crafting 
of the legislation. Evidence shows that there was a deliberate formulation and 
implementation of racist legislation influenced by the science of ‘racial eugenics’. The 
Immigration Act of 1913 was a blatant racialization attempting to restrict Black and 
Indian populations from inter-provincial movements within the Union of South Africa. 
The Immigration Quota Act of 1930 was put in place to prohibit Jewish immigration from 
Eastern Europe, including other white races considered non-Nordic races which were 
labelled as “undesirable and diseased”. 
Arguably, the current Department of home Affairs (DHA) immigration 
dispensations are not new. The Dispensation of Zimbabweans Permit (DZP) (2010) and 
Zimbabwe Special Permit (ZSP) (2014) are but a modernized version of the old “pass 
system” that was used by the apartheid regime to manage migrant labour going into the 
mines. The only difference between the new and the old passes is that new dispensation 
allowed Zimbabweans to work, and to do so with freedom of movement. As such, 
adoption of these forms of immigration control programs points to a systematic recycling 
of practices that were forged under the past racist apartheid governments. 
To further understand the nature of the problem with Zimbabweans fleeing into 
South Africa, the study addresses the precipitous decline of Zimbabwe’s economic 
fortunes, many Zimbabweans were forced to look for alternative means of survival in the 
face mass starvation. Zimbabwe’s economy has been in freefall for almost two decades 
with relatively no cessation in sight. The ZANU PF government has tried to “jumpstart” 
the economy through implementing a number of fiscal policies and development projects 
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without success. ZIMPREST and the NEDPP are some of the programmes implemented 
to resuscitate the decaying economy, but to no avail. 
As South Africa is in proximity to Zimbabwe and its economy is fairly robust, 
most Zimbabweans find refuge by moving into South Africa. However, the patterns of 
movement and motivations to move are varied and context dependent. The Operation 
Murambatsvina was devastating to most Zimbabweans, especially urban dwellers, as it 
left many families without shelter and basic amenities like clean water and access to clean 
food. Hence, most people sought refuge in neighbouring South Africa. 
I established that most Zimbabweans going into South Africa illegally, without proper 
documentation, do so because of a lack of procedural knowledge on immigration, they 
also lack financial resources to fund their document acquisition, and a strong desperation 
to escape the dire situation that characterizes Zimbabwe. 
The study also shows the quandary in which most undocumented migrants are in 
because of a highly the securitized South African immigration regime. South Africa has 
not overhauled its immigration legislation since the 2002 amendments. The Alien Control 
Act of 1991 is in effect though with minor changes. The Green and White Paper of 1997 
and 1998 respectively presented a real chance at immigration reform but due to 
obstructionism and power brokering from some powerful political institutions like the 
ANC, SACP and COSATU, the process of creating substantive new legislation was 
abandoned.  The obstructionism led to the stifling of the policy formulation process as it 
excluded civil society from participating in the creation of a new policy. With the 
exception of a few minor changes, removal of racialized language, the core of the new 
legislation, that is still influenced by apartheid, which championed exclusion of particular 
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groups of people. In this instance, the exclusionary policies were aimed at keeping 
African migrants out of South Africa.  
This study finds that the South African government has had an inclination to 
taking neoclassical positions, which tend to focus on the policies that keep migrants 
entering South Africa at a minimum.  The South African governments’ approach is that of 
making South Africa unattractive to would be migrants by instituting restrictive policies. 
For instance, heavy community policing, refusing access to social services like health 
care facilities, housing, and delays in getting legal documentation are factors that can 
contribute to people not migrating to South Africa. However, the complexity of the 
Zimbabwean migrant problem requires a broader outlook to manage the crisis, which is 
why the discussion of theories like the social capital theory and others were incorporated 
to understand the complex nature of the crisis and allow the examination of the crisis 
from a multi-dimensional perspective.  
The social capital theory does not look at the individual’s agency in making 
decisions to migrate, but rather focuses on the relationships with other entities such as 
family and friends that can help provide information that contributes to a smooth 
migration experience. Evidence shows that Zimbabweans have been going into South 
Africa over time and allowed most to settle regardless of the nature of their legal status. 
These immigrants have gained the knowledge of South Africa’s political and 
socioeconomic landscape, which allow them to provide that vital knowledge to family 
and friends that are en-route into the country. As a result, the new migrants make smarter 
immigration plans that reduce risk. The availability of this information is vital as it guides 
migrants when navigating their way into South Africa and quickly getting employment. 
Due this availability of information from family already in South Africa, migrants know 
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most of the loopholes on how to get into South Africa with or without documentation. 
This explain the continuous influx of Zimbabwean even though the immigration regime is 
restrictive and full of systemic barriers. 
As such, the social capital theory helps inform this study through pointing out why 
Zimbabweans, despite all the structural and bureaucratic impediments, still find migrating 
to South Africa a better option than staying Zimbabwe. 
The assessment of the contents of the Aliens Act of 1995, Immigration Act of 
2002, and the Amendment Acts of 2011 and 2014 was undertaken to highlight the clauses 
that inhibit migrants to participate in the economy. It is clear from the discussion and the 
hesitance on the part of government to be more accommodative with immigration stems 
from the need to retain the national interest while also addressing the human rights 
entitlements enshrined in the constitution. There is no doubt that migrants’ livelihoods are 
impacted by legislation and the immigration laws in South Africa are harsh and foster a 
“we and them” position. The DZP and ZSP are temporary solutions that do not solve the 
problems of  those that are undocumented. With the expiry of the permits in 2017, the 
DHA has reiterated that they will not be renewing the documents; hence, Zimbabweans 
will need to apply from outside the country. The logistical inconsistencies meant to be 
addressed by hiring a private company in form VSF Global to assist DHA in expediting 
the application process have not made a difference. Most applicants are still awaiting 
responses months after submitting their applications. Some have been quoted to have lost 
their livelihoods due to this long turn over period (Washinyira, 2015). 
As this thesis has shown, it is important to have reliable data and research 
capacities that allow institutions to capture data about migration with increased accuracy. 
This would help in the case of South Africa for purposes of planning. Currently, the DHA 
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cannot make headway logistically because it has unreliable statistics about the numbers of 
migrants and other vital statistics like levels of education of migrants, destination areas, 
and languages spoken. Also, research should be done regionally in the SADC region 
showing potential areas of stress that may trigger more than anticipated population 
movements. 
The aim of migration policy should be to inform and guide the law-making 
process, which enables the government of any country to recruit immigrants that suit their 
specific needs for continued socio-economic growth. This would require a progressive 
policy that minimizes bureaucracy and “red tape” if it is to achieve its mandate (De Haan, 
1999). In addition, it is important to appreciate that migration is a normal phenomenon 
that enriches peoples’ lives in both destination areas and areas of origin. Policy must 
therefore focus on how best to support the development of migrant communities so they 
can harness their development potential, which eventually can contribute to the collective. 
It should be noted that policies that are anti-migrant are costly, and they 
disadvantage the poor more than the rich. For instance, the 800 (Rand) (62 USD) fee that 
Zimbabweans pay at VSF Global to apply for a ZSP is too costly and most people in that 
category cannot afford it. This renders these people illegal by not having sufficient 
financing, as such, it does not solve the problem but prolongs it. It is important to note 
that South Africa must take a realistic approach to their immigration policy challenges, 
bearing in mind that, “Migration is a process that governments learn to manage; it is not 
a problem that governments ever solve” (Martin, 2011, p. 9). This study has 
demonstrated through the analysis of past immigration legislation, that the South African 
government has not re-imagined its strategies to help manage extra-ordinary immigration 
issues like the one Zimbabwe or Zimbabweans present. 
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Lastly, the Zimbabwe situation is likely to worsen, if the political climate remains 
uncertain. As such, the South African government needs to create new legislation   to 
accommodate the “extra-ordinary” Zimbabwean situation. The South African government 
needs to diverge from the continued reliance on immigration policies inspired by racism 
and segregation. Temporary measures like DZP and ZSP are not adequately suited to 
address the Zimbabwean migrant crisis in a way that fosters development and stability 
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